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Abstract: After three decades of being relatively constant, the homeownership rate increased over the 
1994–2005 period to attain record highs. The objective of this paper is to account for the observed boom in 
ownership by examining the role played by changes in demographic factors and innovations in the 
mortgage market that lessened down payment requirements. To measure the aggregate and distributional 
impact of these factors, we construct a quantitative general equilibrium overlapping-generation model 
with housing. We find that the long-run importance of the introduction of new mortgage products for the 
aggregate homeownership rate ranges from 56 percent to 70 percent. Demographic factors account for 
between 16 percent and 31 percent of the change. Transitional analysis suggests that demographic factors 
play a more important but not dominant role farther from the long-run equilibrium. From a distributional 
perspective, mortgage market innovations have a larger impact on participation rate changes of younger 
households, and demographic factors seem to be the key to understanding the participation rate changes 
of older households. Our analysis suggests that the key to understanding the increase in the 
homeownership rate is the expansion of the set of mortgage contracts. We test the robustness of this result 
by considering changes in mortgage financing after World War II. We find that the introduction of the 
conventional fixed-rate mortgage, which replaced balloon contracts, accounts for at least 50 percent of the 
observed increase in homeownership during that period. 
 
JEL classification: E0, D58, D91, R21 
 
Key words: macroeconomics, housing 1. Introduction
The homeownership rate in the U.S. achieved new record highs over the period 1994 to 2005.
In Figure 1 we present the evolution of this rate since 1965. As can be seen, the increase in
homeownership is preceded by a quarter century of relatively constant rates. This leads to the
question of why did the homeownership rate increase after 1994.1 The increase in the number of
housing units that are owner-occupied masks interesting disaggregated changes. Between 1994
and 2005 much of the increase in the aggregate homeownership can be attributed to households
of age less than 35 as homeownership increased from 37.3 percent to 43 percent.
Figure 1: Homeownership Rates for the U.S: 1965 to Present
















Average period (1965-94): 64.3
Data Source: United States Statistical Abstract
Given that housing policy in the United States has been directed toward enhancing homeown-
ership through the di⁄erential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, Government Sponsored
Enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and downpayment assistance programs, the
homeownership rate is watched by both researchers and policy makers. The seemingly stationary
behavior of this rate prior to 1994 could be employed as evidence of the failure of housing policy
to enhance homeownership.2 The increase in the homeownership rate since the mid nineties has
been used by some policymakers to argue that recent housing initiatives are starting to have
the desired e⁄ect.3 However, any conclusions about the e⁄ectiveness of housing policy programs
1The small increase in ownership during the late seventies is consistent with the entry of the ￿rst participants
of the baby boomers cohorts. However, the importance to the baby boomers￿generation did not carry over during
the eighties and the ownership rate was stagnant during this time period, see Green (1995).
2For instance, Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) use the constancy of the ownership rate for over 30 years to question
the e¢ cacy of the home interest rate mortgage deduction policy as means of increasing homeownership. They
argue that the deductibility of the mortgage interest and property tax payments encourages homeownership by
the wealthy, who are already homeowners.
3The Bush Administration has argued that the increase in the homeownership rate is evidence that the Amer-
2must consider other factors such as the demographic and institutional changes that have oc-
curred over this period. In this paper we attempt to explain why homeownership has increased
since 1994 by using a quantitative model that pays particular attention to the role of changes
in demographic structure and ￿nancial innovations in the mortgage market.
To gain insight into the impact of demographic and non-demographic factors on the home-
ownership rate, we consider a simple expression that aggregates the participation in owner-
occupied housing across households in the population. We allow households to be of dif-
ferent types. Within a type, all households are identical.4 We denote a household type by
i = f1;:::;Ig = I; where I de￿nes the number of types, and ￿i
t measures the number of house-
holds of each type at time t: The fraction of type i households that are homeowners in period t
is represented by ￿i
t. Hence, the aggregate ownership rate in period t is simply the weighted av-




t: This expression allows changes
in the aggregate ownership rate to be decomposed into changes in the relative size of a type, ￿i
t;
and/or changes in the participation behavior of a type, ￿i
t:
Changes in the demographic structure could be responsible for the growth in homeownership
rate between 1994 and 2005 if these changes occur in household types with larger participation
rates. To evaluate this possibility, we calculate the aggregate ownership rate that would result
under the assumption that the behavior of the di⁄erent cohorts, as captured by the participation





1994: We ￿nd that this calculation yields an increase in the aggregate
ownership rate of 1:92 basis points - a value much lower than the ￿ve basis point change observed
in the data. This implies that around 23 percent of the increase in the homeownership rate
could be a result of changes in the population structure while 78 percent of the increase in
homeownership is left to non-demographic factors.
During this time period, important changes in non-demographic factors occurred that could
a⁄ect the participation rate in owner-occupied housing. Some of these developments include
the introduction of new mortgage products such as the combo loan, a reduction in the cost of
providing mortgage services, an expansion of subprime lending, and the growth and development
of secondary markets to accommodate the introduction of new mortgage products. For existing
homeowners, the e⁄ects of these innovations should not impact the homeownership rate. These
developments could change their housing investment decision as some households might choose
to re￿nance their existing mortgage or choose to sell their property and buy another house. In
either case the household maintains the status of homeowner. For those households that might
have had insu¢ cient resources to meet the downpayment or credit requirements, the e⁄ect of
these ￿nancial innovations could result in an increase in the homeownership rate. For example,
the introduction of a mortgage loan product that allows buyers to purchase a home with a
minimum downpayment relaxes the downpayment constraint and could result in behavior that
increases the participation rate, ￿i
t:
The objective of the paper is to account for the observed increase in the homeownership rate
and thereby understand the role played by demographic factors and mortgage market innova-
ican Dream Downpayment Act which provides downpayment assistance, and has proposed a Zero-Downpayment
Initiative for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured single-family mortgages is working.
4A type allows households to be classi￿ed into di⁄erent socioeconomic groups such as race, income or age.
3tions. To measure the aggregate and distributional impact of these two factors, we construct
a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with housing and mortgage markets. The
model generates participation rates, ￿i
t; that result from household￿ s optimal behavior. Some
of the features of the model are: homeownership is part of the household￿ s portfolio decision;
life-cycle e⁄ects play a prominent role; rental and owner-occupied housing markets coexist; and
households make the discrete choice of whether to own or rent as well as the choice of what quan-
tity of housing service ￿ ows to consume. In each period households face uninsurable mortality
and labor income risks and make decisions with respect to consumption (goods and housing
services), and saving (capital and risky housing investment). Hence, the model stresses the dual
role of housing as a consumption and investment good. The investment in housing di⁄ers from
real capital in that a downpayment and mortgage are required, changes in the housing invest-
ment position are subject to transaction costs and idiosyncratic shocks a⁄ect sales value.5 The
model allows the ￿ ow of housing services from the housing investment to be either consumed or
sold in the rental market if a ￿xed cost is paid.
We estimate the baseline model to match economic and demographic features observed in
1994 and conduct a detailed decomposition of factors that can account for the observed changes
in the ownership rate over the last decade. Demographic changes are considered in isolation.
We also consider innovations in the mortgage market such as reductions in transaction costs of
buying property, decreases in downpayment requirements, and the introduction of new mortgage
contracts such as the combo loan. The introduction of new mortgage products means that
mortgage choice must be explicitly considered and multiple mortgage products must coexist in
equilibrium. This is a contribution of the paper. Finally, we explore the combined e⁄ects of
demographics and mortgage innovation in accounting for the observed change in homeownership.
We ￿nd that the importance of the introduction of a second mortgage product, from a long
run perspective, accounts for between 56 to 70 percent of the increase in the aggregate home-
ownership rate. Demographic e⁄ects account for between 16 and 31 percent. We show that a
reduction of the downpayment requirement in an economy with only one mortgage contract does
not necessarily increase ownership. The relaxation of the downpayment ratio allows households
to purchase housing with larger mortgage payments. In the presence of uninsurable idiosyn-
cractic risk households that receive sequences of negative income shocks can be forced to sell
their house and rent, thus o⁄setting initial homeownership gains. The key to understanding the
increase in homeownership is the expansion on the set of mortgage loans that vary in downpay-
ment requirements and mortgage interest payments. We ￿nd that combo loans with minimal
downpayment requirements tend to be the contract of choice for younger cohorts. Roughly, 80
percent of the predicted increase in the participate rate for the younger cohorts can be attributed
to the introduction of new mortgage instrument. By contrast, demographic factors are especially
important in understanding participation rate changes of households older than age 50. We also
examine the transition path of homeownership to determine whether the importance of various
5There has been a lot of discussion about the high growth rates of house prices over the same time period.
In this paper we do not seek to explain the joint movement of house price and homeownership. Despite being a
limitation of the analysis, our objective is to relate aggregate quantities to changes in fundamental variables such
as the demographic structure, or ￿nancial innovation in the mortgage markets. The introduction of idiosyncratic
capital gains has the objective of partially capturing the risk associated to investing in real estate upon the sale
of the property.
4factors di⁄er from the long-run analysis. We ￿nd that demographic factors play a more impor-
tant, but not dominant , role the further away from the long-run equilibrium. For example,
in 2005, the actual homeownership rate was 69 percent. Along the transition path the model
predicts that if only demographic factors are allowed to change, the homeownership rate for that
year would be 66.3 percent. The combined e⁄ect of demographics and the introduction of a ￿ve
percent downpayment combo loan predict a 68.5 percent homeownership rate for that year. In
this case, demographic factors would account for 58 percent of the increase in homeownership.
On the other hand, a zero downpayment combo loan results in an even larger increase in the
homeownership rate. In this case, the importance of ￿nancial innovation increases in relative
importance and account for 59 percent while demographic factors only account for 41 percent
of the total e⁄ect.
The importance of mortgage market innovations in explaining increases in the homeownership
rate can be further tested by considering movements in the homeownership rate immediately
after World War II. After the collapse of mortgage markets during the Great Depression, a goal
of policymakers was to increase owner-occupied housing. In the later 1930s, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) had the role of altering the forms and the terms of existing mortgage
contracts. Prior to the Great Depression, the typical mortgage contract had a maturity of less
than ten years, a loan-to-value ratio of about 50 percent, repayment of interest only during the
life of the contract, and a balloon payment at expiration. The FHA sponsored the use of a
new type of home mortgage product with a longer duration, lower downpayment requirement,
(i.e.,a high loan-to-value ratio), and self-amortizing with a joint repayment of the principal and
interest. After World War II, the homeownership rate increased from 48 percent to roughly
64 percent by the mid-1960s. This unprecedented growth in ownership still remains a puzzle.
Rosen and Rosen (1980) ￿nd that federal tax policy accounts for approximately four basis points
in the increase in the homeownership rate. This leaves a large fraction of the observed increase
unaccounted. We use our model to examine the importance of the introduction of the standard
￿xed rate mortgage during this time period by conducting a counterfactual experiment. We
introduce the demographic structure from the 1940s and we restrict the set of mortgage choices
to a 9 year balloon contract with a 50 percent downpayment. The model predicts that the
aggregate homeownership rate should fall from 64 percent to less than 55 percent. Theses two
e⁄ects combine to account for 10 basis points of the total increase. We view this counterfactual
experiment as further evidence of the importance of innovations in the mortgage market.
In recent years, there has been a number of papers that have examined housing in a general
equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. Some of these papers are Berkovec and Fuller-
ton (1992), D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2002), FernÆdez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), Gervais
(2002), Jeske and Krueger (2005), Nakajima (2003), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Plantania
and Schlagenhauf (2002), and SÆnchez-Marcos and R￿os-Rull (2006). The focus of these pa-
pers are di⁄erent from ours in that they ignore the joint role of demographics and institutional
changes in mortgage instruments. The paper closest to our paper is Nakajima (2003) who stud-
ies the impact of income inequality on house prices in an endowment economy with segmented
markets. He ￿nds that the observed income inequality can rationalize about one third of the ob-
served increase in house prices, but ignores the impact of ￿nancial innovation and demographics
on homeownership. There exists another line of research that employs econometric techniques.
Savage (1999) explores the barriers to homeownership and discusses how a⁄ordability might be
5changed by altering downpayment requirements, changing interest rates, or permitting subsidies
to renters seeking to purchase a house. Segal and Sullivan (1998) ￿nd that the ageing of the baby
boom generation, increases in educational attainment, and the growth in income all combine
to increase homeownership. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) examine changes in the participation
rate of di⁄erent ethnic groups, and argue that these changes can explain the observed changes in
the aggregate homeownership rate. Fisher and Quayyum (2006) explore the connection between
the high levels of homeownership and residential investment. As part of this study, they examine
the role of changes in demographic factors. Their empirical work suggests that demographic,
income, and education account for one-half of the increase in homeownership. Mortgage market
innovations are not addressed in their paper.
This paper is organized into four sections. In the ￿rst section, we disaggregate U.S. ownership
data to understand the nature of it￿ s change between 1994 and 2005. The second section describes
the model economy and de￿nes equilibrium, while the third section explains how we estimate the
model to the US economy. Section four discusses the parameterization and model evaluation. In
the ￿fth section we examine the quantitative importance of various that can account for changes
in homeownership rate. In the next section we use the housing boom immediately after World
War II to further test the importance of mortgage innovation. The ￿nal section concludes.
2. Empirical Analysis of Changes in the Ownership Rate
In this section, we use U.S. data to understand the sources of change in the aggregate ownership
rate. We begin by more carefully documenting changes in the population structure and the
homeownership rate since 1994. We use annual data from the Housing Vacancies and Home-
ownership from the Current Population Survey to examine the evolution of the homeownership
rate and data from the United States Statistical Abstract to analyze the changes in the popula-
tion structure. We develop in more detail the back of the envelope calculations described in the
introduction. This analysis stresses the importance of changes in participation rate. In order
to better understand the changes in the participation rate, we examine movements in this rate
from an age and income perspective using data from the American Housing Survey.








t is the measure of households of type i in period t; and ￿i
t denotes the ownership rate
for individuals of age i in period t: The contribution of a factor can be roughly estimated by
appropriately holding the other factors constant, and then calculating a hypothetical aggregate
rate. For example, the e⁄ect demographic changes on the homeownership rate can be estimated
by holding the participation behavior of year 1994 constant and using the population structure
of 2005 in the calculation of the aggregate rate. Table 1 summarizes the implied homeownership
rates for di⁄erent combinations of population structures and individual participation behavior.
6Table 1: United States: Actual and Hypothetical Ownership Rate with respect 1994
Ownership Percent
Expression Rate Change




















Data Source: United States Statistical Abstract and Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS)
We ￿nd that if the participation rates for the di⁄erent cohorts remain at their 1994 level and
allow the population structure to change to what is observed in 2005, the implied ownership rate
increases by 1.2 basis points to 65.2 percent. This implies that demographic changes account
for 23 percent of the 5.2 basis point increase of the observed in the homeownership rate between
1994 and 2005. Demographic changes, as re￿ ected in the population cohort weights, do not
seem to be the primary factor in accounting for the overall increase in homeownership. In order
to estimate the e⁄ect of changes in participation rates, the population structure observed in
1994 can be held constant and the participation rates set to their 2005 values. Under this set of
assumptions the implied ownership rate is 68.5 percent. This is a 4.5 basis point increase, and
suggests that changing participation rate across cohorts account for 87 percent of the increase
in the observed aggregate housing participation rate. The implication of this analysis is that the
answer for the increase in the homeownership rate lies in changes in cohort participation rates.
In order to get a better understanding of participation rate changes in the owner-occupied
housing market, disaggregated homeownership data are examined. We focus on changes in the
homeownership rate from an age and income perspective. This analysis is summarized in Table
72.
Table 2: United States: Homeownership Rate by Age and Income of Householder
Householder Age 1994 2005 Di⁄erence
Total 64.0 69.0 5.0
Less than 35 years 37.3 43.0 5.7
35 to 49 years 64.6 68.7 4.1
50 to 64 years 77.6 79.4 1.8
65 to 74 years 80.3 82.7 2.4
75 years and over 73.5 78.4 4.9
Householder
Income 1995 2003 Di⁄erence
Q1 46.63 52.83 6.20
Q2 56.05 67.01 10.96
Q3 64.40 77.93 13.53
Q4 75.54 88.78 13.24
Q5 89.13 96.57 7.44
Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS) and American Housing Survey (AHS)
As can be seen, the homeownership rate increases in all cohorts. What is important is how
the age cohort participation rates changed between 1994 and 2005. The participation rates did
not increase uniformly over the various cohorts. In fact, the largest increase in participation
rates occurs in the households under the age of 35. Even though we observe an increase in the
homeownership rate of households after age 65, the under 35 age cohort ￿nding suggests an
important part of the explanation for the increase in the homeownership rate is understanding
why younger households increased their participation rates. When participation rates by income
quintiles are examined, we ￿nd that this rate increases in each income quintile. In addition, the
participation rate in each quintile is larger in 2005 than 1994. Again, the increase is not uniform
over income quintiles. The larger changes are observed in the middle income quintiles. Since
the mass of households is larger in the lower income quintiles, this suggest understanding the
increase in participation rates in the second and third income quintiles is important.
Another possible factor is migration within the United States. Part of the observed increase
could be explained by the rapid population growth in relatively low-cost (and thus high home-
ownership) states in the South or Southwest. Even in the absence of macroeconomic e⁄ects, the
migration e⁄ect would create an increase in aggregate homeownership rate. This increase would
occur even when the homeownership rates are stable in di⁄erent housing markets. To address
8this issue we present the evolution of the regional homeownership rate since 1965 to present.
Figure 2: Homeownership Rates for the U.S. and Regions: 1965 to Present





















Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS)
Figure 2 summarizes the aggregate homeownership rate for the U.S. and for four distinct
regions comprised of Northeast, the Midwest, the South and the West. Prior to 1994 the
stationary pattern observed in the aggregate homeownership rate does not carry over to the
regional rates. For example, in the West region there is some slight downward trend while in the
Northeast region the trend appears to be slightly increasing. However, the important observation
is that the homeownership rates increased across all four regions after 1994 achieving historical
highs around 2005 even in the presence of migration ￿ ows.6
To summarize, in the last decade we have faced the largest increase in homeownership since
the mid-1960s. Changes in the population structure and participation rates for di⁄erent cohorts
appear to be important factors. While changes in the population structure are relatively well
understood, changes in the participation rate for di⁄erent age and income cohorts are less well
understood. Given how ownership rates increase in households younger than age 35 and in
the second and third income quintiles, factors that reduce the ￿nancial burden of becoming
homeowner must be considered. We use a model to illustrate how a⁄ordability might change
the participation rate through reductions in transaction costs, adjustments in downpayment
requirements, or the introduction of new mortgage products.
3. The Model
We consider a production economy comprised of households, production ￿rms, a ￿nancial ￿rm,
and a government. Households have a ￿nite horizon and face uninsurable labor income and
6We also examined movements in the homeownership rate by family type. After 1994, married households,
male households, and female households all had rising participation rates.
9mortality risk. Households make decisions with respect to the consumption of goods, the con-
sumption of housing services, and saving which can be in the form of either riskless capital
denoted by a 2 A with a net return r; and a housing investment good which is risky and
denoted by h 2 H with a market price p: The model stresses the dual role of housing as a con-
sumption and investment good. Investment in housing di⁄ers from real capital since it requires
a long-term mortgage contract and is subject to transaction costs. Mortgage loans are available
from a ￿nancial sector that receives deposits from households and also loans capital to private
￿rms. The production side is standard as we consider neoclassical ￿rms that use capital and
labor to produce a consumption/investment good and housing. The government has a dual role
of taxing income and providing retirement bene￿ts through a social security system. Income
taxes are distortionary, especially as they pertain to mortgage ￿nance.
3.1. Housing Characteristics and Mortgage Contracts
We model housing as a risky investment/consumption good. The nature of housing investment
di⁄ers from investment in capital along several important dimensions.
1. House investment size: In this model housing investment is lumpy and indivisible.
We denote the size of the housing investment by h 2 H where H ￿ f0g [ fh;:::;hg and
h < ::: < h: The lumpiness, along with transactions costs, generates infrequent adjustments
in housing investment positions. The indivisibility of this investment with h > 0 results
in some households being unable to participate, and thus forces housing services to be
acquired in a rental market. If a household chooses to change their investment position,
their existing housing investment must be sold and a new housing position purchased.7
2. Housing as a risky investment: The decision to sell property is subject to an i.i.d.
idiosyncratic capital gains (or amenity) shock, ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ f￿1;:::;￿zg: The shock determines
the ￿nal sale value p￿h received by the homeowner. This shock alters the size of the
housing investment by a factor ￿.8 In addition, this shock is not observed until the house
is sold. Households know the unconditional probability of this event which is represented
by ￿￿. 9
7This assumption di⁄ers from the standard durable good model where individuals can expand the set of
durables every period until they attain their desired level. In our model, households can purchase homes of
di⁄erent sizes, but they are forced to sell if they desire to buy a di⁄erent unit. Since housing investment requires
the use of a long-term mortgage contract, it becomes computationally infeasible to have households holding a
housing portfolio with di⁄erent mortgage balances.
8The idiosyncratic capital gains or amenity shock allows a risk to be associated with housing without intro-
ducing an aggregate shock that determines capital gains. Adding aggregate uncertainty is not computationally
feasible in this model at this time. The amentity shock can be thought of as what happens to a property if the
surrounding neighborhood deteriorates (or improves). This change would be re￿ ected in the house value at the
time of sale. An additional advantage of the formulation is that the necessity of matching buyers and sellers is
avoided. Since any buyer can always purchase a home independent of the shock received by the seller.
9In Jeske and Krueger (2005), homeowners face an depreciation shock every period that changes the size of the
housing investment position next period. Since homes are transacted every period using a one-period mortgage,
homeowners readjust their portfolio every period. In our formulation, the capital gain shock is only realized upon
the transaction of the property. Consequently, it does not a⁄ect the ￿ ow of services that homeowners receive
every period.
103. Housing investment/consumption good: Housing investment, h > 0; generates a
￿ ow of housing services, s; that can be consumed. We assume a linear technology, s =
g(h0) = h0; that transforms the housing investment in the current period into housing
services in the same period. In this model, homeowners derive utility from the housing
services generated by the housing investment decision made in the current period, h0. This
timing di⁄ers from other housing (and durable goods) models where the state variable h
generates housing services within the period. The separation between housing investment
and housing consumption allows us to formalize rental markets. Those households that
have a positive housing investment can choose to consume all housing services s = h0; or
pay a ￿xed cost $ > 0 and sell (lease) some services in the market equal to g(h0) ￿ s at
the rental price R:10
4. Housing maintenance: The consumption of housing services depreciates the housing
investment, and requires maintenance to maintain the discrete size investment position.
The implied maintenance expense, x(h0;s); depends on the size of housing investment and
whether housing services are consumed by homeowners or rented to other individuals.11 A
homeowner that chooses to consume all services generated from their housing investment
position incurs a maintenance expense equal to x(h0;s) = ￿oph0 where ￿o represents the
depreciation rate of owner-occupied housing. If a household chooses to pay the ￿xed cost
to become a landlord, the maintenance expense depends on the fraction of services the
household consumes and the fraction other households consume. The di⁄erent depreciation
cost is a result of a moral hazard problem that occurs in rental markets as renters decide
on how intensely to utilize/depreciate a house. To illustrate the nature of the problem,
we assume that households can choose two di⁄erent e⁄orts to maintain the dwelling e 2
feL;eHg: The depreciation rate of the housing stock depends on the e⁄ort ￿(e): Since
a homeowner understands the costs associated with utilization, an incentive exists to
maintain the home, and thus they exert (high) e⁄ort to maintain their house. When
landlords cannot observe the utilization rate or maintenance e⁄orts of tenants, they assume
all renters will choose a low maintenance e⁄ort eL: The depreciation rate associated with
low e⁄ort is ￿r > ￿o: The maintenance cost of rental-occupied housing is determined as
x(h0;s) = p[￿rh
0
￿ (￿r ￿ ￿o)s]: The formal implications of moral hazard is a spread in
depreciation rates (4￿ = ￿r ￿ ￿o > 0) that e⁄ectively reduces the implicit cost of owner-
occupied consumption. This e⁄ect also introduces a kink in the consumer budget constraint
on the point where households choose to consume all their housing services. The market
rate for rental services will incorporate the moral hazard problem and renters have to pay
a premium re￿ ecting the additional maintenance cost.12 Maintenance is not subject to
10The introduction of the ￿xed cost prevents homeowners from freely using the rental market to bu⁄er negative
income shocks. This cost should be view as either a time opportunity cost, or as a management fee. These costs
are paid every period and are independent of the size of the property.
11Henderson and Ioannides argue that there is an externality associated with the rental of housing services.
The individual who consumes the services generated by a house decides on how intensely to utilize the house,
but does not consider the associated costs if they are not the owner of the house. This assumes the mortgage
contract can not be written to explicitly provide for such contingencies. In order to have housing services rented
by non-homeowners, the renter must pay higher contract rents.
12Household preferences, ￿nancial incentives, or the allocation of control have also been used as arguments to
explain why renting is more expensive than owning .
11transaction costs.
5. Housing ￿nancing: Housing investment requires a mortgage contract and is also subject
to entry (transaction) costs. Mortgages loans are available from a ￿nancial sector that
receives deposits from households and also loans funds to private ￿rms. In this paper
we stress the importance of ￿nancial innovation in the mortgage market through the
introduction of new mortgage products. We represent a the type of mortgage product
held by a household by z 2 Z = f0;1;:::;Zg, where z = 0 indicates that no mortgage is
held. Mortgage contracts can di⁄er along a number of dimensions such as downpayment,
amortization terms, length of contract, and interest payment. Since the objective to this
paper is to investigate the impact of ￿nancial innovations that result in a new mortgage
product and not the impact of mortgage choice, we restrict the type of mortgage products
that are available to a household.
The decision to purchase a house of size h0 at price p requires a downpayment equal to
￿(z) 2 [0;1] percent of the value of the house. The downpayment requirement depends on
mortgage type, z: The initial amount borrowed is represented by D(N) = (1 ￿ ￿(z))ph0
where N is the length of the mortgage contract. In each period, t, a household with mort-
gage type z faces a mortgage payment that depends on the price of housing p, the housing
size h0, the length of mortgage N, the downpayment fraction ￿(z), and the mortgage in-
terest rate rm(z). A mortgage payment in period n 2 N = (0;1;:::;N) can be represented
as m(x;z) where x de￿nes the set (p;h0; (z);n;N;rm(z)):13
For any mortgage contract, payment can be decomposed into an amortization term,
A(n;z); that depends on the amortization schedule, and an interest rate payment term
I(n;z) which depends on the payment schedule. That is,
m(x;z) = A(n;z) + I(n;z); (3.1)
where the interest payments are calculated by I(n;z) = rm(z)D(n;z): The law of motion
for the level of housing debt D(n;z) can be written as,
D(n ￿ 1;z) = D(n;z) ￿ A(n;z); (3.2)
or combining this expression with the mortgage payment m(x;z) yields
D(n ￿ 1;z) = (1 + rm(z))D(n;z) ￿ m(x;z): (3.3)
The law of motion for home equity increases with mortgage payments. That is
E(n ￿ 1;z) = E(n;z) + [m(x;z) ￿ rm(z)D(n;z)]; (3.4)
where E(N;z) = ￿(z)ph0 denotes the home equity in the initial period.
In the baseline model we assume that the only contract available is a standard
13In this paper, we assume mortgages have the same contract length. In addition, a mortgage payment is made
in the period the mortgage is written. This is due to the fact that in our model a household is able to purchase
a home and consume the service ￿ ow from that house in the same period.
12￿xed rate mortgage (FRM), z = 1. This mortgage contract is characterized by a con-
stant mortgage payment over the length of the mortgage which results in an increas-
ing amortization schedule of the principal and a decreasing schedule for interest pay-
ments. That is, the constant payment schedule satis￿es m(x;z) = ￿D(n;z) where ￿ =
rm(z)[1￿(1+rm(z))￿N]￿1:In a stationary environment, the housing stock, h; the type of
mortgage contract, z; and remaining length of the mortgage, n; are su¢ cient to recover all
the relevant information of the mortgage contract. That includes the mortgage payment,
liabilities with the ￿nancial intermediary, and equity in the house.
6. Tax treatment of housing: The tax treatment of housing di⁄ers from capital invest-
ment. The model captures some of the prominent provisions in the tax code towards
housing. Those include a distortionary tax code, the deductibility of mortgage interest
payments, I(n;z); and the exclusion of the imputed rental value of owner-occupied hous-
ing from taxable income, Rs.14 The tax code favors housing investment relative to real
capital and owner-occupied housing more attractive than rental housing.
3.2. Households
Households are described by preferences, earnings capabilities and age. We index a household￿ s
age by j 2 J = f1;2;:::;Jg where each household lives to a maximum of J. Survival each period
is uncertain. The conditional probability of surviving from age j to age j + 1 is represented
by  j+1 2 [0;1] where  1 = 1: Life expectancy for a newborn cohort is given by
QJ
j=1 j+1:
Household preferences are represented by index function u(c;s) where c is the consumption of
goods and s represents the amount of housing services consumed. The utility function u : R2 !
R is C2 and satis￿es the standard Inada conditions. Lifetime utility is discounted every period
at a rate ￿ > 0:
A household is endowed with a ￿xed amount of time each period and they supply this
endowment to the labor market inelastically until retirement at age j￿ < J: Households di⁄er in
their productivity for two reasons - age and period speci￿c productivity shocks. We de￿ne ￿j as
the average labor productivity of an age j individual. A household also draws a period speci￿c
earnings component, ￿; from a probability space; where ￿ 2 E. The realization of the current
period productivity component evolves according to the transition law ￿￿;￿0. Thus, a worker￿ s
gross labor earnings in a given period are w￿￿j where w is the market wage rate. Additional
sources of income are interest earnings, ra, and rental income received by supplying housing
services to the rental market R(h0 ￿ s) where R represents the rental price. Rental income can
only be received by those households that have a housing investment position h0 > 0 and pay a
￿xed cost to supply rental property. Retired households receives a social security bene￿t from
the government equal to ￿: We de￿ne the household￿ s gross income as:
gy(a;h0;s;￿;￿j;j;q) =
(
w￿￿j + ra + R(h0 ￿ s); if j < j￿;
￿ + ra;+R(h0 ￿ s); if j ￿ j￿;
(3.5)
14In the U.S. tax code capital gains from owner-occupied housing are usually tax exempt, whereas from rental
property are tax. In our model we do not make a distinction between owner and rental occupied housing invest-
ment, as a result we assume that capital gains are not taxed. This assumption does not a⁄ect the nature of our
main results with respect to ownership and is made for tractibility.
13where q = fp;R;r;rmg represents a price vector. The U.S. tax code treats the imputed income
from housing services di⁄erently depending on who consumes the services from housing. In this
formulation we capture the asymmetric treatment of housing where rental income is taxable,
R(h0￿s); but the imputed services ￿ ows from owner-occupied housing, Rs; are not taxable. All
these sources of income (labor, savings, social security payments, and rental income) are subject
to taxation. The tax code di⁄erentiates exemptions from deductions. We de￿ne adjusted income
as gross income minus deductions ￿. Formally,
ay(a;h0;s;￿;j;q) = gy(a;h0;s;￿;j;q) ￿ ￿:
Examples of such deductions could be a deduction for mortgage interest rate payments, or
maintenance expense deductions.
In this economy the government uses a progressive income tax represented by the function
T(ay) where ay denotes adjusted gross income. The tax function is continuously di⁄erential
where T0(ay) > 0 represent the marginal tax rate and T(ay)=ay > 0 represents the average tax
rate. In addition, labor earnings are subject to social security contributions denoted by ￿p: We





(1 ￿ ￿p)w￿￿j + (1 + r)a ￿ T(ay); if j < j￿;
￿ + (1 + r)a ￿ T(ay); if j ￿ j￿:
(3.6)
The household￿ s current period budget constraint depends on the household￿ s exogenous
income shock, ￿, its beginning of period asset holding position, a, the current housing position,
h, mortgage choice, z; the length of the mortgage contract remaining, n, the current age, j;
and the household decisions with respect to their consumption, c, housing consumption, s, asset
position, a0; and housing position, h0; for the start of the next period. We can isolate ￿ve di⁄erent
situations with respect to the household problem.
1. Renter
In this model there are two ways for a household to consume rental-occupied housing in
the current period. A household could have been a renter in the prior period and choose
to remain a renter. Alternatively, a household could have been a homeowner in the prior
period and decide to sell the housing property and become a renter in the current period.
The choice problem depends on the housing investment decision.
Renter yesterday (h = 0) and renter today (h0 = 0) : Consider a household that
does not own a house at the start of the period, h = 0; and decides to continue renting
housing services in the current period, h
0
= 0: This individual does not have a mortgage
contract in either period z = z0 = 0 and thus has no mortgage payment obligations so










14s:t: c + a0 + Rs = y(a;h0;s;￿;￿j;j;q) + tr; (3.7)
c;s;a0 ￿ 0;
where Rs denotes the cost of the housing services purchased in the rental market and tr
is the lump-sum transfer from accidental bequests. The constraint a0 ￿ 0 indicates that
asset markets are incomplete as short-selling is precluded.
Homeowner yesterday (h > 0) and renter today (h0 = 0) : In this case the household
enters the period with a positive housing investment position, h > 0; and decides to rent,
h0 = 0; in the current period. 15 The decision to sell property is subject to an idiosyncratic
capital gain shock, ￿, that determines the ￿nal sale value, p￿h; that the homeowner receives
when changing the size of the housing investment. The unconditional probability of the


















s:t: c￿ + a0
￿ + Rs￿ = y(a;h0;s;￿;￿j;j;q) + tr + [(1 ￿ ￿s)p￿h ￿ D(n;z)]; (3.8)
c￿;s￿;a0
￿ ￿ 0:
In this speci￿c case, the sale of the house generates income, p￿h, net of selling costs, ￿s and
the remaining principle D(n;z) which depends on the mortgage type z:16 For households
with no mortgage, D(0;0) = 0: Notice that the consumption of goods, housing services,
and savings are conditioned on the idiosyncratic capital gain shock. This is because net
income depends on the realization of ￿:
2. Homeowner
In the model there are three di⁄erent avenues for a household to have a housing invest-
ment position, h0 > 0; in the current period. A household could have been a renter in
the prior period and decide to purchase a home. Alternatively, a household could have
been a homeowner in the prior period. In the current period, the household can remain
a homeowner by maintaining the same housing investment position, or either upsize or
downsize housing investment. Each choice involves di⁄erent constraints.
Renter yesterday (h = 0) and become a homeowner (h0 > 0) : In this case, we have
a household who rented in the previous period, h = 0, and chooses to invest in housing,
h
0
> 0. The housing investment is ￿nanced by a mortgage contract choice z that requires
an initial expenditure of (￿b +￿(z))ph0 where ￿b is a transaction cost parameter and ￿(z)
represents the downpayment requirement of the contract. The period mortgage payment
15In the last period, all households must sell h; rent housing services and consume all their assets, a, as a




16As our analysis will be conducted at the steady state, other than the di⁄erences between buying and sell-
ing transaction costs, there are no di⁄erences in the purchase and selling prices of housing, p, except for the
idiosyncratic capital gain shock.
15is m(x;z): In this model we separate housing investment from housing consumption. The
reason for the distinction is that households￿have the ability to sell housing services thus
generating rental income. To participate in the rental market as a landlord, a period
￿xed cost, $ > 0; must be incurred.17 Otherwise, the optimal housing consumption is
determined by h0: In order to incorporate this decision into the choice problem we introduce
an indicator variable, Ir; that takes on the value of unity when the household chooses to





u(c;s) + ￿ j+1
X
￿02E
￿(￿;￿0)v(a0;h0;z0;max(n ￿ 1;0);￿0;j + 1)
)
;
s:t: c + a0 + (￿b + ￿(z))ph0 + m(x;z) + x(h0;s) = y(a;h0;s;￿;￿j;j;q) + tr + Ir
￿




c;s;a0;h0 ￿ 0 and s ￿ g(h0):
The actual maintenance expense, x(h0;s); depends on whether some of the housing services
are rented to other individuals. In addition, the choice of mortgage product is de￿ne over
a discrete number of choices where the max operator is de￿ned over the optimal choice
z￿: In the baseline model we restrict the set of choices to z 2 Z = f0;1g, and hence, all
homeowners choose z0 = 1:
Homeowner maintains housing size (h = h0 > 0) : In this case the household maintains
the same housing investment, h = h0 and mortgage contract, z = z0.18 We allow for the
possibility that the homeowner has paid o⁄ their mortgage so that z = 0 and n = 0: The





u(c;s) + ￿ j+1
X
￿02E
￿(￿;￿0)v(a0;h0;z0;max(n ￿ 1;0);￿0;j + 1)
)
;
s:t: c + a0 + m(x;z) + x(h0;s) = y(a;h0;s;￿;￿j;j;q) + tr + Ir
￿




c;s;a0;h0 ￿ 0 and s ￿ g(h0);
where n0 = maxfN￿1;0g: In this situation, the household must make a mortgage payment
17In this economy the decision to supply rental property is entwined with the decision to invest in housing.
The separation of housing consumption services and housing investment allows us to formalize the rental market
keeping the state space relatively tractable. Introducing two di⁄erent housing stocks such as owner-occupied and
rental-occupied would require solving a larger portfolio choice problem which adds additional computationally
complexity.
As a result, all the landlords are homeowners but the not the other way around. The American Housing Survey
reports that the fraction of individuals that report receiving rental income as well as consuming rental housing
services is almost zero.
18The objective of the paper is to understand changes in the aggregate homeownership rate not to explain the
observed re￿nancing.
16if n > 0. Again, it is important to remark that the decision to consume housing services
and the size of maintenance expenses depends on choice of paying a ￿xed cost $ to become
a landlords.
Homeowner changes housing size (h 6= h0 > 0) : The household decides to either
up-size (h0 > h > 0) or down-size (h > h0 > 0) their housing investment. The optimization
problem is more cumbersome since we have to jointly determine the mortgage choice and
the housing service consumption decisions, as well as account for the uncertainty associated




















s:t: c￿ + a0
￿ + (￿b + ￿(z0))ph0
￿ + m(x;z0) + x(h0;s) (3.11)






+ [(1 ￿ ￿s)p￿h ￿ D(n;z)];
c￿;s￿;a0
￿;h0
￿ ￿ 0 and s￿ ￿ g(h0
￿):
This constraint accounts for the additional income from selling their home (net of trans-
action costs, ￿sp￿h; and remaining principle, D(n;z)), the cost of buying a new home, as
well as the capital gain shock associated with the sale of the home. Once again individ-
ual choices depend on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock ￿. In this case, both the
savings and housing investment choices depend on the amenity shock.
3.3. Financial Sector
The ￿nancial intermediary is a zero pro￿t ￿rm. This ￿rm receives the deposits of the households,
a0 and o⁄ers mortgages to the household sector, as well as loans to production ￿rms. These
mortgages generate revenues each period. In addition, ￿nancial intermediaries receive principal
payments from those individuals who sell their home, or unexpectedly die with an outstanding
mortgage position. These payments are used to pay a net interest rate on these deposits, r: The
balance sheet of the ￿nancial intermediary is represented by:
Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Loans to ￿rms Deposits
Net mortgage loans
We postpone the description of the market clearing condition for the ￿nancial sector until the
description of market equilibrium.
173.4. The Production Sector
A good, which can be used for consumption, capital or housing purposes, is produced by rep-
resentative ￿rm that attempts to maximize pro￿ts. The production technology in this sector is
given by a constant return to scale technology Y = f(K;L) where K and L are aggregate inputs
of capital and labor, respectively. Capital depreciates at the rate ￿ each period. In the absence
of adjustment costs in the housing stock, the relative price of capital and housing is unity.
3.5. Government
In this economy, the government engages in a number of activities ranging from ￿nancing exoge-
nous government expenditure, providing retirement bene￿ts through a social security program,
and redistributing the wealth of those individuals who die unexpectedly. We assume that the
￿nancing of government expenditure and social security are run under di⁄erent budgets.
The government provides retirement bene￿ts, ￿: These bene￿ts are ￿nanced by taxing em-
ployed individuals at the tax rate ￿p: Since this policy is self-￿nancing, the tax rate depends on

















where ￿j is the size of the age j cohorts.
In the general budget constraint, government expenditures are determined by the amount of
revenue collected from income taxation. Since income taxes are not linear we de￿ne t(a;h;z;n;￿;j)
to be the tax obligations of each households based in their position in the state space. Hence,
the general budget constraint can be expressed as:
G =
Z
￿jt(a;h;z;n;￿;j)￿(da ￿ dh ￿ dz ￿ dn ￿ d￿ ￿ dj): (3.13)
The term ￿(￿) represents the measure of households.
Lastly, the government collects the physical and housing assets of those individuals who
unexpectedly die. Both of these assets are sold and any outstanding debt on housing is paid o⁄.
The remaining value of these assets is distributed to the surviving households as a lump sum





where Tr is the aggregate (net) value of assets accumulated over the state space from unexpected
18death and is de￿ned as19
Tr =
Z





￿j(1 ￿  j)[(1 ￿ ￿s)p￿h(a;h;z;n;￿;j) ￿ D(a;h;z;n;￿;j)]￿(da ￿ dh ￿ dz ￿ dn ￿ d￿ ￿ f2;::;Jg):
3.6. Market Equilibrium Conditions
This economy has four markets: the asset market, labor market, the rental of housing services
market, and the goods market. All these markets are assumed to be competitive.
In this model, the asset market clearing condition is complicated by the presence of mortgages
and unexpected death. In attempt to clarify, we introduce some additional notation that distin-
guishes whether a decision is impacted by an idiosyncratic capital shock which is realized only
when a property is sold. The individual state vector can be summarized by ￿ = (a;h;z;n;￿;j):
Let Is(a;h;z;n;￿;j) ￿ Is(￿) be an indicator value that is equal to 1 when housing is sold and




































￿j(1 ￿  j)D(￿)￿(d￿);
where ￿(d￿) ￿ ￿(da ￿ dh ￿ dz ￿ dn ￿ d￿ ￿ dj):
The ￿rst two terms on the right hand side of the equation capture the savings deposited
by households to the ￿nancial intermediary. The former term captures savings if a property is
not sold while the latter term allows the savings decision to be impacted by the idiosyncratic
capital gain shock when a home is sold and appropriately by weighted by the measure of those
households receiving a particular amenity shock. From this amount, new mortgages loans must
be subtracted and this is captured by the third and fourth terms on the right side. The two
terms allow for di⁄erences created by the idiosyncratic capital gains shock. The next two terms
account for mortgage payments received by the ￿nancial intermediary. That includes payments
received by ￿rst-time buyers and existing homeowners who continue to make payments on their
mortgage, as well as those homeowners that sell their property and have a new mortgage payment
which is a⁄ected by the idiosyncratic capital gain shock. The last ￿nal terms on the right hand
side measure the payment of outstanding mortgage principal from those households who sell
their house as well as the payment of outstanding debt of households who unexpectedly die with
19In the formulation, the new born generation does receive a lump sum transfer as we endow these individuals
with capital assets as observed in data. In this model the aggregate mass of households of age 1 is ￿1 and total
population is normlized to one.
19a outstanding principle.
The rental price of rental-occupied housing is determined by the aggregate amount of hous-
ings services made available by landlords and the total demand of rental housing services. That
is, the rental market equilibrium condition is:
Z
Is(￿)=0















where allowances for idiosyncratic gains shocks are incorporated.
The goods market clearing condition is de￿ned as:
C + K0 + IH + G + ￿ = F(K;L) + (1 ￿ ￿)K; (3.16)
where C, K0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K; IH; G, ￿ represent aggregate consumption expenditures, aggregate
investment in ￿xed capital, aggregate investment in housing goods, government expenditure,























































































The equilibrium wage determined in a competitive labor market where labor demand is equal
20to labor supply. That is,




where labor is inelastically supplied by households. Labor demand is determined the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst
order condition. :
3.7. Stationary Equilibrium
We restrict ourselves to stationary equilibria. The individual state of the economy is denoted by
(a;h;z;n;￿;j) 2 A￿H￿Z ￿ M ￿ E￿J where A ￿ R+; H ￿ R+; z ￿ I;M ￿ R+; and E ￿R+:
De￿nition: A stationary competitive equilibrium is a collection of value functions v(a;h;z;n;￿;j;):
A￿H ￿ Z ￿M￿E ￿ J ! R; decision rules a0(a;h;z;n;￿;j): A￿H ￿ Z ￿M￿E ￿ J ! R+;
and h0(a;h;z;n;￿;j) : A ￿ H ￿ Z ￿ M ￿ E ￿ J ! R+; aggregate outcomes fK;N;g; prices
fr;w;rm;Rg; government policy variables f￿;￿g; stationary population; and invariant distribu-
tion ￿(a;h;z;n;￿;j) such that:
1. given prices, fr;w;rm;p;Rg; the value function v(a;h;z;n;￿;j) and decision rules c￿(a;h;z;n;￿;j);
s￿(a;h;z;n;￿;j); a0
￿(a;h;z;n;￿;j); Ir￿(a;h;z;n;￿;j) and h0
￿(a;h;z;n;￿;j) solve the con-
sumer￿ s problem20;
2. given prices fr;w;rm;p;Rg; the aggregates fK; Ng solve the ￿rms￿pro￿t maximization
problem by satisfying equations;
3. the price vector fr;w;rm;Rg is consistent with the zero-pro￿t condition of the ￿nancial
intermediary;
4. the asset market as de￿ned by equation (3.14) clears;
5. the rental market as de￿ned by equation (3.15) clears;
6. the goods market as de￿ned by equation (3.16) clears;
7. the labor market as de￿ned by equation (3.17) clears;
8. the retirement program is self-￿nancing as stated by equation (3.12);
9. The government budget constraint expressed in equation (3.13) holds;
10. letting T be an operator which maps the set of distributions into itself aggregation requires
￿0(a0;h0;z;n ￿ 1;￿0;j + 1) = T(￿);
and T be consistent with individual decisions.
We will restrict ourselves to equilibria which satisfy T(￿) = ￿:
20The subscript term ￿ denotes that the decision rules are contingent on the value of the i.i.d capital gain shock
when a property is sold. If a sales does not take place, then this index would not appear.
214. Parameterization of Model
We parameterize the model to reproduce some key properties of U. S. economy observed in 1994.
We choose to estimate most of the parameters using an exactly-identi￿ed Method of Moments
approach. Once the economy is parameterized, we evaluate the model and then illustrate how
the baseline model can be used to address the question posed with respect to homeownership.
We commence by specifying the relevant functional forms and certain institutional parameters.
We then discuss the choice of targets. It is important to remark on two aspects of the parame-
terization. First, the estimation procedure is embedded with the general solution of the model
when equilibrium is computed. Second, the model is estimated to aggregate variables and not
distributions.
4.1. Preferences and Technology
Our choice of utility function departs from the standard constant relative risk aversion with a
homothetic aggregator between consumption c and housing services s: This type of preference
structure is not consistent with an increasing ratio of housing services/ consumption ratio by
age which is observed in the data, [see Jeske (2005) for a detailed discussion]. We assume that
preferences over the consumption of goods and housing services can be represented by a period








where ￿1and ￿2 determine the curvature of the utility function with respect to consumption and
housing services. The relationship between ￿1 and ￿2 determines the growth rate of the housing
to consumption ratio. When ￿1 > ￿2 the marginal utility of consumption exhibits relatively
faster diminishing returns. In general, as income increases households choose to spend a larger
fraction of income on housing.21 We choose to set ￿2 = 1 and ￿1 = 3 to match the observed
average growth rate, and the preference parameter ￿ is estimated.
Aggregate output is produced through a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production
function
F(K;L) = K￿L1￿￿;
where ￿ represents the relative share of capital in output. The capital share parameter is set
to 0:29. This value is calculated by dividing private ￿xed assets plus the stock of consumer
durables less the stock of residential structures by output plus the service ￿ ows from consumer
durables less the service ￿ ow from housing.22 In the absence of adjustment costs the price of
housing is unity.
21At some low income levels, expenditures of housing may not increase with inceases in income. This is due to
the existence of borrowing constraints and the ￿ lumpiness￿of the housing investment.
22We could have included this parameter as part of the estimation problem. We did not for two reasons. The
value of this parameter is not controversial. In addition, expansion of the estimation problem will add computation
time to a problem that takes signi￿ciant time to compute.
224.2. Structural Parameters
￿ Demographic Structure: We select a period in our model to be three years. A in-
dividual starts their life at age 20 (model period 1) and lives till age 83 (model period
23). Retirement is mandatory at age 65, (model period 16). Individuals survive to the
next period with probability  j+1:These probabilities are set at survival rates observed
in 1994, and data are from the National Center for Health Statistics, United States Life
Tables, 1994. In a steady state equilibrium with a stationary population, the size of each
cohort is determined by ￿j: Each cohort share is determined from ￿j =  j￿j￿1=(1+￿) for
j = 2;3;:::;j and
PJ
j=1 ￿j = 1; where ￿ denotes the rate of growth of population. Using
resident population as the measure of the population, we set this the annual growth rate
to 1.2 percent.
￿ Mortgage Contracts and Housing Markets: These parameters capture institutional
features associated to mortgage contracts and housing markets. In the benchmark model
we assume that the only mortgage contract available is the standard ￿xed rate mortgage
(FRM). The length of the mortgage, N, is set at 10 which corresponds to 30 years, and the
downpayment requirement, ￿(z); is set at twenty percent.23 Buying and selling property
is subject a transaction costs. We assume that all of these costs are paid by the buyer and
set ￿s = 0 and ￿s = 0:06:
The parameter $ a⁄ects the number of households that choose to become landlords.
Determination this parameter is di¢ cult as we have no direct evidence on the number
of households that own rental property. An indirect measure is to calculate the number
of households or more precisely the number of homeowners that report to receive rental
income. In the AHS around 10 percent of the sampled homeowners claim to receive rental
income. With the lowerbound estimate we choose to set $ to 0.05.
￿ House size and capital gain shocks: Given the lumpy nature of housing investment,
the speci￿cation of the minimum house size, h; has implications for the homeownership
decision. If h is to large (small) the fraction of younger cohorts that will buy homes is
small (large) and the model cannot replicate the observed aggregate homeownership. To
avoid having the choice of this variable having inadvertent implications for the results, we
determine the size of this grid point as part of the estimation problem. The remaining
grid points are evenly spaced.
We used data from the 1995 American Housing Survey to quantify the i.i.d. capital
gain shock. To calculate the probability distribution for this shock we measure capital
gains based on the purchase price of the property and what the property owner believes
to be the current market value. This ratio is adjusted by the holding length to express the
appreciation in annualized terms. We estimate a kernel density and then discretize the
23The 1995 American Housing Survey is employed in the speci￿cation of these parameters. We construct a
downpayment fraction using data on value of home purchased and the amount borrowed on the ￿rst mortgage.
A sample of 17,902 households is generated. The downpayment fraction for ￿rst time home purchases is 0.1979
while the fraction for households that previously owned a home is 0.2462. We set ￿ corresponding to the ￿rst
time homeowner downpayment fraction. Since most households use a thirty year mortgage, we spectify N to be
equal to 10.
23density into three even partitions. The average annualized prices changes ranging from
lowest to highest are -6.6, -1.4, and 10.5 percent. These values are adjusted to be consistent
with a period being de￿ned as three years. In order to test the robustness of the estimated
base on the data from the American Housing Survey, we employed a similar approach
using 1995 Tax Roll Data for Duval County in Florida which includes Jacksonville. This
data follows real estate properties as opposed to individuals. As a result, we can calculate
annualized capital gains based in actual sales. We ￿nd very similar estimates for the
idiosyncratic capital gain shock using this data source.
￿ Endowments and labor income shocks: Workers are assumed to have an inelastic
labor supply, but the e⁄ective quality of their supplied labor depends on two components.
One component is an age-speci￿c, ￿j; an is designed to capture the 0hump0 in life cycle
earnings. We use data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 0Money, Income of Households,
Families, and Persons in the Unites Stated, 1994,0 Current Population Reports, Series P-60
to construct this variable. The other component captures the stochastic component of
earnings and is based on Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004). Based on their empirical
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Each household is born with an initial asset position. The purpose of this assumption is
to account for the fact that some of the youngest households who purchase housing have
some wealth. Failure to allow for this initial asset distribution creates a bias against the
purchase of homes in the earliest age cohorts. As a result we use the asset distribution
observed in Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to match the initial distribution of
wealth for the cohort of age 20 to 23. Each income state has assigned the corresponding
level of assets to match the nonhousing wealth to earnings ratio.
￿ Government and Progressive Income Tax: The government provides retirement in-
24come through a social security program. We assume the retirement program is self-￿nanced
through a payroll tax on the labor earnings of workers. After retirement, households re-
ceive a transfer based on some fraction of the average labor income. We target the average
replacement rate of thirty percent which results in a worker payroll tax of 5.25 percent.
Our inclusion of the government transfer program reduces the marginal utility of poor
and retired household, thus minimizing possible distortions in the housing decisions of the
elderly.
In addition to the retirement program, the government ￿nances general spending G
through a progressive income tax. This choice captures some the asymmetries in the U.S.
tax code that favors owner-occupied housing. We allow mortgage interest payments and
maintenance expenses for rental property to be deductible. Nevertheless, the imputed
rental value of owner-occupied housing does not generate a tax obligation whereas rental
income is taxed.
Following Conesa and Krueger (2006) we use as income tax code the estimated functional
form from Gouveia and Strauss (1994) that is theoretically motivated by the equal sacri-
￿ce principle. Total taxes T(ay) based on adjusted gross income are determined by the
functional form
T(ay) = ￿0(ay ￿ (ay￿￿1 + ￿2)
￿1
￿1 );
where (￿0;￿1;￿2) are policy parameters. The marginal income tax rate is




The parameter ￿0 is a scaling factor that determines the level of the tax brackets and the
marginal tax rate but does not impact the curvature of the tax function. The parameter ￿2
depends on units of measurement used to measure income and determines the size of income
deduction. Gouveia and Strauss estimate the policy parameters and ￿nd that ￿0 = 0:258;
￿1 = 0:768; and ￿2 = 0:0037: In the benchmark economy we use the same parameter
estimates used by Gouveia and Strauss for ￿1 but ￿2 is set to 0.371 to accommodate the
model measurement units. The parameter ￿0 is endogenously determined when solving the
model to target a 7.4 percent ratio of federal government expenditure-GDP observed in
1994.24 In all simulations, the parameters are set at the values estimated in the benchmark
model and government expenditure is allowed to adjust. This choice is motivated by the
fact the we are interested in the equilibrium e⁄ects associated to demographics and the
introduction of new mortgage contracts. Adjusting the tax rate to generate the same level
of revenues would obscure the direct impact of the aforementioned changes.
The entire set of parameters are presented in Table 3 in annualized terms.
24The Gouveia and Strauss tax function was estimated for the period 1979-1989. As our model is calibrated
for the period 1994-1996, we acknowledge some inconsistency. However, since our focus is on the importance of
various margins impacted by housing policy, we do not feel this inconsistency is a major problem.



















The remaining structural parameters are estimated. The choice of estimation targets and
the parameter estimates are discussed in the next section.
4.3. Estimation
There are seven structural parameters that still need to be determined. We estimate these
parameters using an exactly-identi￿ed Method of Moments approach. The parameters that
need to be estimated are the depreciation rate of the capital stock, ￿; the depreciation rate
for rental units, ￿r; the depreciation rate for ownership units, ￿o; the relative importance of
consumption goods to housing services, ￿; and the individual discount rate, ￿; the minimum
size of the smallest housing investment position, and the tax function parameter ￿0: We de￿ne
￿ = (￿;￿r;￿o;￿;￿;h;￿0) as the vector of structural parameters. We identify these parameter
values ￿ so that the resulting aggregate statistics in the model economy Fn(￿) are determined
by the seven speci￿ed targets Fn for n = 1;:::;7 observed in the U.S. economy. The estimation of
the structural parameters is not separated from the computation of market clearing. This means
three additional nonlinear equations (asset market, rental market, and accidental bequest) that
have be satis￿ed. More details about the estimation are provided in the appendix.
Data for the seven targets comes from two di⁄erent sources: NIPA data and the American
Housing Survey. We use the following targets based on NIPA data. The ￿rst target is the
ratio of capital to gross domestic product (GDP) which is about 2:541; (annualized value) for
the period 1958-2001. We de￿ne the capital stock as private ￿xed assets plus the stock of
consumer durables less the stock of residential structures so as to be consistent with capital in
26the model. Output is GDP plus service ￿ ows from consumer durables less the service ￿ ow from
housing.25 The second target is the ratio of the housing capital stock to the nonhousing capital
stock. The housing capital stock is de￿ned as the value of ￿xed assets in owner and tenant
residential property. We ￿nd ratio of the housing stock to nonhousing capital stock to be 0:43.
The third target is the investment in capital goods to output ratio which is 0:135. The ratio
of the investment in residential structures to housing capital stock is the fourth target and is
set at 0:121: The targeted housing consumption to nonhousing consumption is also based NIPA
data where housing services are de￿ned as personal consumption expenditure for housing and
non housing consumption is de￿ned as non durable and services consumption expenditures net
of housing expenditures. The targeted ratio for 1994 is 0.23, but the value does not vary greatly
over the period 1990-2000. The ￿nal target using NIPA data is the government expenditure-
output ratio. De￿ning government expenditure as federal government expenditures, we ￿nd this
ratio for 1994 to be 7.4 percent. The remaining target is based on data from the American
Housing Survey. The homeownership rate in the period 1994 is 64.2 percent.
The annualized values of the parameter estimates are summarized in Table 4.26 The implied
targets generated by the model solution along with the market clearing equations are within less
than one percent error in each target.
Table 4: Estimation of Model (Annual Values)
Statistic Target Model %Error
Ratio of wealth to gross domestic product (K=Y ) 2.541 2.5446 0.143
Ratio of housing stock to Fixed capital stock (H=K) 0.430 0.4266 -0.792
Housing Investment to Housing Stock ratio (xH=H) 0.040 0.0403 -0.388
Ratio housing services to consumption of goods (Rsc=c) 0.230 0.2291 -0.411
Ratio ￿xed capital investment to GDP (￿K=Y ) 0.135 0.1353 0.339
Homeownership Ratio 0.640 0.6370 -0.468
Government expenditure to output (T(ay)=Y ) 0.074 0.0742 -0.005
Variable Parameter Value
Individual Discount Rate ￿ 0.9749
Share of consumption goods in the utility function ￿ 0.9541
Tax Function Coe¢ cient ￿0 0.1974
Depreciation rate of owner occupied housing ￿o 0.0340
Depreciation rate of rental housing ￿r 0.0749
Depreciation rate of capital stock ￿k 0.0428
Minimum Housing Size h 1.4726
The baseline economy is estimated to match certain key features of the US economy in 1994.
We evaluate the performance of the model in terms certain housing characteristics. A natural
starting place is to inquire how the model performs in terms of certain aggregates. Since the
25We estimated services ￿ ows using procedures outlines in Cooley and Prescott (1995).
26Our estimate of the depreciation rate on owner occupied housing are somewhat higher than the estimates of
Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2007) who ￿nd annual depreciation rate in the 2.0 to 2.5 range.
27aggregate homeownership rate is a target in the estimation problem, we examine whether the
model generates a reasonable amount of young, or 0￿rst-time buyers.0 Data suggests that 37.3
percent of households under age 35 own houses. The model generates a participate rate of 37.6
percent indicating that the model slightly overstates homeownership for this cohort. Another
dimension of interest is the consumption of housing services. We measure average consumption
of housing services by average size of an owner-occupied house. Data from the American Housing
Survey (AHS) ￿nds the average owner-occupied house is 2,137 square feet. Our model implies an
average house size of 2,348 square feet. Since housing rental market in endogenously determined,
we also examine this market. There are a number of ways to evaluate this aspect of the model.
We calculate the fraction of household that choose to have a landlord position. Data from the
AHS implies that between ten and ￿fteen percent of households have a rental position. Our
model predicts that seventeen percent of households have a landlord position. In other words,
the model over predicts entry into the rental market which suggest the ￿xed entry cost may be
too low. These aggregate results are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5: Summary of Aggregate Results
Home Home Owner
Own Rate Own Rate Occupied Fraction
(over 25) (under 35) House Size1 Landlord
Data 1994 64.0% 37.3% 2,137 10-15%
Baseline Model 1994 63.7% 37.5% 2,348 17%
1 Housing units are measured in terms of square feet.
The distributional behavior of the model must also be evaluated over various housing di-
mensions. The model stresses the role of housing as an investment and consumption good. The
performance of the model with respect to investment in housing can be evaluated in a number
of ways. The homeownership rate can be examined from either an age or income perspective.
As can be seen in Table 6, the homeownership rate has a humped shaped behavior with the
highest rate occurring in the 65-74 age cohort. In general, the model generates a similar pattern.
The model generated homeowership for the 20-34 and 75 and over cohorts that are smaller than
what is observed. The underprediction of the oldest cohort, which is much larger as compared
to the under 35 cohort, is a result of the assumption that households must rent in the ￿nal
period. For the other cohorts, the model generated a participation rate that exceeds observed
values. It is important to note that the model generates renter behavior in all age cohorts.
This is important if changes in mortgage market conditions are to be properly evaluated. In
terms of income quintiles, data indicates a rising homeownership rate in income. From a income
perspective, data indicates the participation rate increases with income. The model generates
a much steeper pro￿le. The homeownership rate implied by the model for the ￿rst quintile is
28smaller than what is observed in the data, and for the remaining quintiles the rates are larger.
Table 6: Homeownership Rates by Age and Income
Variable Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 40.0 64.5 75.2 79.3 77.4
Baseline Model 1994 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
by Income Quintiles Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Data 1994 46.6 56.1 64.4 75.5 89.1
Baseline Model 1994 32.0 83.9 98.4 100.0 100.0
Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS) and American Housing Survey (AHS)
An alternative way to evaluate the model with respect to investment in housing is to examine
the share of housing in home-owners portfolios by age cohorts. Figure 3 presents data and model
results on the relative importance of housing in the portfolio by age. Actual data is from the
1994 Survey of Consumer Finances. We focus only on households that own a home and use the
respondent￿ s estimated value of their house adjusted for remaining principle to calculate the net
housing investment position. Since the only other asset in the model is capital, we combine data
on bond and stock holding to approximate this asset.27 We use this data to calculate the fraction
a household￿ s portfolio in housing and ￿nd a ￿U-shaped￿pattern. Flavin, M. and T. Yamashita
(2002) ￿nd a similar pattern in their work on household portfolios. This pattern re￿ ects the fact
that young households have a biased portfolio towards housing. As the household ages income
increases and alternative savings forms become feasible. Later in life, housing becomes relatively
more important as the equity stake in the home grows with age while other assets begin to be
27Bonds are de￿ned as bond funds, cash in life insurance policies, and the value of investment and rights in
trusts or estates, while stocks are de￿ned as shares of stocks in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, or
investments trusts including stocks in IRA￿ s.
29used for consumption purposes. A similar pattern behavior is replicated by the model.
Figure 3: Housing in the Portfolio by Age
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Data source: Survey Consumer Finance (SCF)
Housing consumption should also be examined. Average housing size of owner-occupied hous-
ing in terms of square feet can be assembled from the American Housing Survey. In Table 7,
we report observed housing size by age cohorts. Housing size increases until age 65 when some
downsizing begins to appear. The model captures the magnitude and the hump-shaped behavior
by age groups. However, some over prediction of house size is observed.
Table 7 : Owner-occupied Housing Consumption
Simulation Sqft. Owners1
by Age Cohorts
Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 2,137 1,854 2,220 2,301 2,088 2,045
Baseline Model 1994 2,348 2,147 2,297 2,429 2,514 2,362
Data source: American Housing Survey (AHS)
An alternative approach to evaluating the model is to examine the ratio of housing con-
sumption to non-housing consumption over the life cycle. Jeske (2005) states that this ratio
increases over the life cycle. When we calculate this pro￿le from the model, we ￿nd a housing to
nonhousing consumption ratio that increases over the life cycle. Since the model seems to be a
viable instrument, we next consider the question of why the homeownership rate has increased
in the second half of the 1990s.
305. What accounts for changes in homeownership?
We now employ the model to analyze the observed increase in the homeownership rate since
1994. Our strategy is to decompose variations in homeownership caused by changes in key factors
- demographic and innovations in the mortgage markets. We measure the importance of each
factor by calculating the implied long-run equilibrium in the model when one factor is changed
at a time while holding the other factor constant. More precisely, we begin by analyzing the
implication of demographic changes holding the characteristics of the mortgage market constant.
Then, we hold constant demographic factors, but allow for the introduction of new mortgage
products. The last step to allow both factors to change so we can estimate of the joint e⁄ect of
demographics and mortgage innovation. At the end of the section we address short-run e⁄ects.
5.1. Demographics Factors
The ageing population in the United States along with lower fertility rates and higher life
expectancy has changed the demographic structure of the economy. During the 1990s, the
share of the population between age 35 and 54 became the largest cohort group. In a relatively
short time, the number of individuals older that age 55 will be of similar size to this younger
cohort. Since the participation rate in the owner-occupied housing market increases with age
until age 75, the observed movements in homeownership could be entirely driven by changing
demographic factors. The simulations from Section 2 suggest that the demographic e⁄ects are
small when only demographic factors are allowed to change. However, this exercise does not
take into consideration the impact of demographic factors for individual behavior and market
prices. In this section, we use our quantitative model to examine the implications of changing
demographics for the homeownership rate.
Table 8 summarizes the impact of a change in the demographic structure in the model by
generating a long-run population distribution based on the observed population growth rate in
2005 rather than the growth rate observed in 1994. The baseline model generates a long-run
aggregate homeownership rate of 63.7 percent. When the stationary population structure based
on the 2005 growth rate is employed, the homeownership rate increases to 64.7 percent. The
resulting increase of 1 basis point suggests that the impact of demographic factors are relatively
small as the actual change in the homeownership rate is ￿ve basis points. In other words,
the model indicates that changes in the population structure account for twenty percent of the
31(long-run) change in the homeownership rate.




Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 64.0 37.3 64.6 77.6 80.3 73.5
Data 2005 69.0 43.0 68.7 79.4 82.7 78.4
Di⁄erence 5.0 5.7 4.1 1.8 2.4 4.9
Baseline Model 1994 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
Baseline Model 2005 64.7 37.9 76.8 86.8 91.6 65.9
Di⁄erence 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 -0.4
Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS)
The one percent increase is distributed across all age groups until age 74. Those individuals
of 75 years and over slightly reduce their participation. The distributional impact is very small
and is in￿ uenced by the general equilibrium e⁄ects that a⁄ect the rental price and the interest
rate. The increase in the number of middle-aged and older households leads to an increase
in savings and a small reduction in the interest rate. The increase in homeownership results
in an increase in the supply of rental property which reduces the rental rate. The oldest age
group takes advantage of these equilibrium price e⁄ects by reducing homeownership and renting
housing services. Another problem with the demographic explanation is the failure to account
for the observed individual cohort changes. For example, the actual increase in the participation
rate for households under age 35 is not observed when only demographic factors are considered.
Consequently, to understand the behavior of these younger cohorts we need to consider additional
factors.
5.2. Innovations in the Mortgage Market
Since the early 1990s, a number of developments have occurred with respect to the ￿nancing of
the housing investment. These changes include a reduction in the cost of providing mortgage
services, the introduction and expansion of new mortgage products such as the combo loan or
no-downpayment mortgage, an expansion of subprime lending, and the growth and development
of secondary markets to accommodate these new mortgage products. While these innovations
should have minimal impact for existing homeowners, they do a⁄ect households not in the
housing market - the so-called ￿rst-time buyers - who may not meet downpayment restrictions,
or do not satisfy credit requirements. The e⁄ect of these innovations could be large for households
not in the housing market. A combo loan which allows homes to be purchased with minimum
or zero downpayment is an attractive mortgage product for households excluded due to a high
downpayment constraint. In this section, we employ the quantitative model to examine the
32importance of innovations in the mortgage market that modify existing frictions.28
5.2.1. Reduction in Transaction Costs
The Federal Housing Administration publishes a series measuring the costs of fees and charges
associated with FHA loans. Since 1985, fees have declined from approximately two percent
of the purchase price to less than 0.5 percent of the purchase price. Part of this decline in
buyer transactions is due to a number of private programs, such as the Nehemiah Program, the
AmeriDream Downpayment Assistance program, the HART Action Resource Trust, Consumer
Debt Solutions, and Partners in Charity, that have developed over the last decade to reduce
closing costs. In order to investigate the impact of reduction in transaction costs, we reduce the
buying cost parameter from 6 to 3 percent our model.
In Table 9, we summarize some of the results from this experiment where demographics
have been held at their 1994 stationary values. The reduction in transaction costs results in an
increase in the aggregate homeownership rate from 63.7 percent to 64.1 percent. However, the
increase is not close to the 69.0 percent homeownership rate observed in the 2005. The reason
why a decline in transactions does not result in a large increase in homeownership can be seen
by examining homeownership rates for the 20-34 age cohort. The increase in the homeownership
rate for this particular cohort does not respond as much as observed in actual data.
Table 9: A Reduction in Transaction Costs
(1994 Population Growth Rate)
Simulation Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts
Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Baseline Model 1994 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
Reduction Transaction Costs (￿ = 3%) 64.1 38.3 76.6 87.3 91.4 65.7
28An obvious question is why lower mortgage interest rates are not the reason why homeownership rates in-
creased? Lower mortgage rates allow homeowners to face smaller mortgage payments, thus making homeownership
more potentially a⁄ordable. Lower mortgage rates do not necessarily result in more homeownership if these house-
holds are borrowing constrained because of the lack of the downpayment. Painter and Redfearn (2002) examine
the role of interest rates in in￿ uencing long-run homeownership rates and ￿nd that interest rates play little direct
role in changing homeownership rates. Furthermore, an examination of the data indicates that the aggregate
homeownership rate has been relatively steady between 1965 and 1994 despite ￿ uctuations in (real) mortgage
rates.
An analysis of changing interest rates is not possible in the current form of our model. We could examine
the impact of a decline in the wedge between the risk free rate and the mortgage interest rate. The wedge
approximates a spread can between the (long term) mortgage rate and a risk free government bond. Using the
30 year FHA mortage rate and the interest rate on a one year government bond (secondary market), we found no
evidence that this spread changed since 1995.
335.2.2. A Reduction in Downpayment Requirements
We have previously mentioned the importance of reducing downpayment requirement if the
homeownership rate is to change signi￿cantly. In this section, we investigate whether a reduction
in the downpayment requirement will result in an increase in homeownership. During the 1994
to 2005 period, a number of innovations occurred that allow households to purchase housing with
lower downpayments. Changes is screening techniques occurred. In addition, new government
programs allowed for reduced downpayments for low income and ￿rst-time buying households.29
In Table 10, we present data from various samples of the American Housing Survey that allow
us to determine how average downpayment ratios have changed over time. Between 1995 and
2003 the average downpayment for FHA loans declined. The decline in downpayment fractions
between 1995 and 1999 can be partially attributed to the introduction of mortgage insurance.
All FHA loans required mortgage insurance if the loan-to-value ratio exceeds eighty percent.
Mortgage insurance essentially allows the homeowner to trade-o⁄ the size of the downpayment
for a higher monthly payment until the loan-to-value rate declines to eighty percent. However,
by 2001 the average downpayment for an FHA loan increased back to 18.1 percent, and then
declined in 2003. The higher downpayment ratios in the 2000￿ s as compared to 1999 does raise
the question whether a decline in this ratio could be the primary factor that accounts for the
increase in the homeownership.
Table 10: Downpayment First-Time Buyers by Loan Type





Data source: American Housing Survey (AHS)
We explore the importance of reducing the downpayment requirements by conducting an
experiment where the downpayment ratio is reduced from 20 to 10 percent. In this experiment
we maintain the assumption that the demographic environment is assumed to characterized
by the 1994 steady state values. In addition, we do not allow for the existence of mortgage
insurance. The former assumption will tend toward conservative estimates, while the latter
assumption introduces a bias toward the a reduction in this borrowing constraint having a
29For example, The Clinton Administration enacted policies through the Federal Home Administration (FHA)
to have lower downpayment requirements with mortgage insured loans. The Bush Administration has developed
the Zero-Downpayment Initiative for FHA to generate additional ￿rst time home buyers. These programs, no
doubt, had a positive impact on the homeownership rate, but it might be hard to merit its impact given its
relatively small funding.
34larger impact. The results from this experiment are reported in Table 11.
Table 11: Reduction in the Downpayment Requirement
(1994 Population Growth Rate)
Simulation Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts
Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Baseline Model 1994 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
Reduction Downpayment (￿ = 10%) 63.5 38.0 76.3 85.1 90.8 66.3
The reduction of the downpayment requirement does increase the homeownership rate of
the youngest cohorts 37.5 to 38.0 percent. Surprisingly, the downpayment reduction reduces the
aggregate homeownership rate from 63.7 to 63.5. The intuition for this result is in the trade
o⁄ between downpayment and mortgage interest obligations in tradition long-term ￿xed rate
contracts. The relaxation of the downpayment ratio allows households to purchase housing with
larger mortgage payments. In the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, larger obligations
reduce the household￿ s ability to smooth income risk. This e⁄ect forces some households that
receive consecutive negative income shocks to sell their house and rent. This ￿nding contrasts
with some housing models where households adjust the size of the dwelling every period.30
In this type of model a reduction of downpayment constraint should have a positive e⁄ect in
housing investment and in homeownership. Our results indicate the e⁄ect of a reduction in the
downpayment requirement for the aggregate homeownership rate is more complicated as the
some age cohort homeownership rates increase while others decline.
5.2.3. Introduction new mortgage products: Combo loan
During the time period where the homeownership increased, a number of new mortgage loan
products were introduced in the mortgage market. These products are know generically as
￿ combo loans￿and lessened the downpayments requirement while allowing households to avoid
mortgage insurance. The combo loans are di⁄erentiated by their down payment requirements. A
￿ 80-20￿combo loan" corresponds to a loan with a traditional loan-to-value ratio of eighty percent
where a second loan is used to fund the twenty percent downpayment. Alternatively, the ￿ 80-
15-5￿mortgage loan requires a 5 percent downpayment along with the remaining 15 percent
coming from a second loan. In general, the interest rate on the second loan has approximately
30We have in mind a model where there are no transaction costs and housing wealth ph
0 and ￿nancial wealth
(1 + r)a
0 can be summarized by a single state variable such as cash on hand:
x
0 = ph
0 + (1 + r)a
0;
and where the period budget contraint is de￿ned by
c + ph
0 + a
0 = w + x:
and the mortgage constraint is
a
0 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)ph
0:
35a two percent rate premium above the interest rate on the primary mortgage loan. Government
Sponsored Enterprises initiated the use of this product in the late 1990￿ s and this mortgage
product became popular in private mortgage markets between 2001 and 2002. The reason that
the combo loan dominates a standard FRM loan with mortgage insurance is that insurance
premium is based on the full loan value, whereas in the combo loan is only on the secondary
loan. Tax considerations make the bene￿ts from the combination loan product even greater due
to the higher interest payments associated with this loan. In this section, we analyze the impact
of the introduction of this mortgage contract for the homeownership rate. We know from the
prior section that replacing one loan product with a loan product with a lower downpayment
requirement may not result in a large increase in the homeownership rate. In this section, we
introduce a combo-loan product while maintaining a standard ￿xed rate contract. The expansion
of the set of mortgage contracts available allows households who prefer a traditional mortgage
product to maintain that choice while allowing households that were previously excluded by
the high downpayment requirement to now enter homeownership via a product with a lower
downpayment requirement.
We conduct a set of experiments that measure the impact of the introduction of alternative
forms of combo loans in conjunction with the standard FRM contract. In the simulations, the set
of mortgage choices must increase to accommodate the combo loan choice. Households decide
on the preferred contract, z￿; based on a comparison of the current net bene￿ts and continuation
value associated with each contract. The combo loan payment structure di⁄ers from the standard
FRM since two di⁄erent loans must be repaid. The primary loan covers (1 ￿ ￿(z)) of the value
of the dwelling D1(N1;z) = (1 ￿ ￿(z))ph0 and is of maturity N1 with mortgage payments
m1(x;z): The secondary loan either fully or partially covers the remaining value of the dwelling,
￿(z)ph0:That is, the loan is equal to D2(N2;z) = {￿(z)ph0, where { 2 (0;1] determines whether
a downpayment is required. If { < 1; then a downpayment equal to (1 ￿ {)￿(z)ph0 is required.
The interest rate on the second loan includes an interest premium ￿, (where ￿ > 0);so the
interest rate is rm
2 = rm
1 +￿; with with maturity N2 ￿ N1 and mortgage payment m2(x;z): The





m1(x;z) + m2(x;z) when N2 ￿ n ￿ N1;
m1(x;z) when n < N2;
where the laws of motion for the principal and equity payment for each loan are computed as
in the mortgage with constant repayment.
To study the impact of mortgage innovation we assume that households have the choice of
￿nancing their housing investment with a standard thirty year ￿xed rate mortgage with a 80
percent loan-to-value (LVT) ratio and a 20 percent downpayment requirement or a combo loan.
We evaluate a set of combo each having the primary loan with a 80 percent LVT percent loans
with an 80 percent LVT, but having di⁄erent downpayment requirements as part of the second
loan. For each of these alternative combo products, we assume both mortgage contracts have
a thirty year duration, and the premium on the second mortgage is two percent annually. This
spread is consistent with the spread observed in the market over this period. We also assume the
demographic structure corresponds to the 1994 stationary population distribution. The various
36experiments are summarized in Table 12.
Table 12: Homeownership Rates with Combo Loans
(1994 Population Growth Rate)
Mortgage Contracts Available Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts
Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 64.0 37.3 64.6 77.6 80.3 73.5
Data 2005 69.0 43.0 68.7 79.4 82.7 78.4
Baseline Model 1994 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
FRM(20%Down) and Combo(10%Down) 64.8 39.5 77.3 87.2 91.7 65.9
FRM(20% Down) and Combo(5% Down) 65.5 40.0 79.5 87.2 92.2 65.5
FRM(20% Down) and Combo(0% Down) 68.1 46.6 82.2 85.1 90.8 66.2
Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS)
We will start by considering a combo loan that includes a ten percent downpayment. With
this option being available, the model generates an aggregate homeownership rate of 64.8 percent.
Thus, the homeowership rate is 1.1 basis points higher than in the environment where on a
conventional ￿xed rate mortgage exists. If the downpayment percentage in the combo loan falls
to ￿ve percent, the aggregate homeownership rate increases 65.5 percent. This is almost a two
basis point increase over a single mortgage environment. The introduction of mortgage choice
eliminates the negative e⁄ect on the aggregate homeownership rate observed in the simulation
where the downpayment is reduced for all homeowners. More importantly, the availability of the
combo loan option results in an increase in the participation of the cohorts under age 35. The
data indicates that these rates increased since 1994 by 5.7 basis points. The model predicts that
the participation rate for these households increases 2.0 basis points when the downpayment
constraint is ten percent and 2.5 basis points with a ￿ve percent downpayment requirement.
In the early 2000￿ s, a combo loan that allowed a household to invest in housing without having
a downpayment became popular. With this type of combo loan, the household borrows the full
amount of the house value using a primary loan with a 80 percent LTV ratio and a secondary
mortgage to cover the remaining 20 percent. The introduction of this alternative mortgage
contract option into our model results in the aggregate homeownership increasing to 68.1 percent
in contrast to a participation rate of 63.7 percent when only a traditional mortgage is available.
The e⁄ect of the introduction of this contract for homeownership in the youngest cohort is even
more dramatic as the homeownership rate increases to 46.6 percent. This percentage exceeds
the homeownership rate actually observed for this cohort in 2005.
The introduction of the combo loan option allows younger (￿rst-time) buyers who lack the 20
percent downpayment to enter the housing market by with a smaller downpayment requirement
couple with larger future payments. Those households who can meet the 20 percent requirement
can still choose the standard loan with a lower mortgage payments. As can be seen in Table 13,
the model predicts that seventy-seven percent of the homeowners choose a conventional FRM
while 23 choose the combo loan with a ￿ve percent downpayment. The combo loan is especially
37attractive to younger households as the model ￿nds they hold 42 percent of this product. The
introduction of a combo loan product increases the homeownership rate across all the age cohorts
with the exception of the cohorts of age 75 and older.
Table 13: Distribution of Combo Loan Holder by Age
(1994 Population Growth Rate)
Mortgage Contracts Available Combo Loan Holdings
Percent Percent by Age Cohorts
FRM Combo 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Baseline Model 1994 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
FRM and Combo(10%Down) 81.4 18.6 55.1 21.9 15.8 5.8 1.4
FRM and Combo(5% Down) 76.8 23.2 42.8 24.4 17.2 13.4 2.2
FRM and Combo(0% Down) 67.2 32.8 38.5 24.1 17.9 14.8 4.7
The model ￿nds that individuals between age 20 and 34 hold the largest share of combo
loan holdings. As the downpayment requirement declines, the share of combo loans held by
the youngest cohort decreases. Despite the decline in this share, the total number of outstand-
ing combo loan holdings by this cohort increases by 49 percent. It is important to recognize
that homeownership rates increase as the downpayment requirement associated with the combo
product decreases. This means the youngest cohorts use of the combo loan causes the largest
contribution the increase in the aggregate homeownership rate. The model ￿nds that 32.8
percent of household choose the "no-downpayment" combo option.
In order to stress the importance of mortgage product choice, we reexamine the impact on
homeownership rates if mortgage product choice is restricted to combo loan products. We have
shown that a downpayment reduction has an important quantitative e⁄ect when combined with
mortgage products that allow a lower LTV ratio. When only a single combo loan product is
only available, our results are very similar to the results when the downpayment requirement
is reduced in a standard FRM. The simulations presented in Table 14 show that the in an
economy with a only a combo loan that requires a ￿ve percent downpayment requirement or a
no downpayment loan, the homeownership rate in the aggregate and for households under age
35 decreases. The explanation for this result relies in interest rate changes. In the stationary
equilibrium with only a standard mortgage contract with a 20 percent downpayment the interest
rate is 5.43 percent. When we replace this contract with a 80-15-5 combo loan the equilibrium
interest rate increases to 5.64 percent in the primary loan with a 7.64 percent rate for the
38secondary loan.
Table 14: Homeownership Rates with Combo Loans
(1994 Population Growth Rate)
Mortgage Contract Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts
Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Baseline Model 1994 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
Combo(5% Down) 55.8 30.5 65.6 79.0 83.3 61.3
Combo (0% Down) 54.9 29.9 64.3 78.2 82.6 60.9
Our quantitative model illustrates the importance of introducing mortgage contracts that
trade-o⁄ the downpayment requirements for larger mortgage payments to understand the ob-
served change in the aggregate homeownership rate. While such data on mortgage holdings by
product type during is not readily available on the national level, the American Housing Survey
asks homeowners about the source of their downpayment.31 An examination of the responses
indicates that the fraction of ￿rst time buyers under 35 years of age that purchase a house with
no downpayment increased 16 percent over this period while from an aggregate perspective the
fraction of household￿ s who do not use a downpayment is essentially unchanged. Other relevant
motives such as personal saving and gifts have declined in importance. While this data is sugges-
tive at best, the results are consistent with our ￿nding that ￿rst time buyers are the household
types who ￿nd combo loans especially attractive. These individuals, who tend to under the age
of 35, would report no downpayment if surveyed by the AHS.
5.3. Demographic E⁄ects and Mortgage Innovation: The Decomposition
In this section, we use our quantitative model to measure combined e⁄ects of demographic factors
and ￿nancial innovations to account for the observed increase in the aggregate homeownership
rate. We ignore innovations in the ￿nancial sector that result in a reduction in transactions
costs. The reason is that our prior analysis suggested that changes in transactions costs have
small e⁄ects on the aggregate homeownership rate. Ignoring this innovation will tend to view
31There is some detail information about mortgage holdings. This information mainly separates mortgages
by maturity (i.e. 15 or 30 years), and di⁄erent type of contracts (i.e. FRM, ARM, or Balloon), but does not
di⁄erentiate mortgages by downpayment types.
39our measure of ￿nancial innovation as a conservative measure.
Table 15: Homeownership Rates with Combo Loans
(2005 Population Growth Rate)
Mortgage Contract Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts
Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 64.0 37.3 64.6 77.6 80.3 73.5
Data 2005 69.0 43.0 68.7 79.4 82.7 78.4
Baseline Model 1994 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
FRM(20% Down) and Combo(5% Down) 67.0 41.8 79.8 87.4 91.8 64.2
FRM(20% Down) and Combo(0% Down) 70.0 48.0 84.2 86.5 91.4 66.2
Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS)
In Table 15, we report how the expansion of the set of mortgage choices due to the intro-
duction of the combo loan product e⁄ects aggregate homeownership rate under a stationary
demographic structure with the 2005 population growth rate. We ￿nd that changing both fac-
tors substantially increases in the aggregate homeownership rate. A combo loan that requires
a ￿ve percent downpayment results in an aggregate homeownership rate of 67.0 percent. If a
combo loan has no downpayment requirement, we now ￿nd that homeownership rate increases
to 70.0 percent.
We observe the ownership rate, once the combo choice is introduced with this demographic
structure, results in participation rates for cohorts under age 35 that are very similar to those
observed in the data. Interestingly, the combined e⁄ects also increase the ownership rate for
the next cohort by a magnitude not found in prior experiments. These results suggest that
the introduction of the combo loan impacts the younger cohorts. The ageing of the population
re￿ ected by the increase of the share of older and middle age cohorts is more likely to a⁄ect
their participation rates.
Table 16 : Summary Decomposition Analysis for the Homeownership Rate
(2005 Population Growth Rate)
Combo (5% Down) Combo (0% Down)
Change % Change Change %Change
Actual Change 5.0 5.0
Total Change (Model) 3.2 6.3
Pure Demographic E⁄ect 1.0 31.3 1.0 15.8
Pure Financial Innovation E⁄ect 1.8 56.3 4.4 69.8
Joint E⁄ect 0.4 12.5 0.9 14.3
We now proceed to the decomposition exercise so we can measure the magnitudes of the
various factors, and thus answer the question of what accounts for the increase in the homeown-
40ership rate. We report the decomposition for the two combo loans products. The decomposition
exercise from a long-run perspective is reported in Table 16.
We start by examining a combo loan with a ￿ve percent downpayment requirement. We ￿rst
calculate the total change in the homeownership rate when both mortgage contract innovation
and demographic structure are allowed to change and compare these results to those of the
baseline model. This generates an increase in the homeownership of 3.2 basis points. This
change understates the observed change of 5.0 basis points. The pure demographic e⁄ect is
measured by introducing the 2005 stationary demographics and not introducing an new mortgage
instrument. As we discussed previously, a one point basis point increase occurs. This tells us
that the pure demographic e⁄ect accounts for 31.25 percent of the model generated change
in the homeownership rate. The pure ￿nancial e⁄ect can be measured by the change that
occurs when an addition mortgage instrument be available and demographics held constant
at their 1994 stationary values. These values are also reported in Table 12. As can be seen,
the introduction of the combo loan product in this environment results in an increase in the
aggregate homeownership rate of 1.8 basis points or 56.3 percent of the change in the aggregate
participation rate. The remaining e⁄ect, or joint e⁄ect, is the result of having a larger fraction
of the population in life-cycle stages that have higher participation rates, and the fact that new
mortgage products make it possible for a larger number of households to purchase housing. This
e⁄ect accounts for 12.5 percent of the total change.
If the 5 percent combo loan is replaced with a no downpayment mortgage contract the model
generates a 6.3 basis point increase in the aggregate participation rate. The pure demographic
e⁄ect accounts for 15.8 percent of the total change, while the ￿nancial innovation e⁄ect accounts
for 69.8 percent. The remaining 14.3 percent is the joint e⁄ect. We view this decomposition as an
upperbound estimate the long-run quantitative e⁄ects implied from ￿nancial market innovations.
5.4. Transitional Dynamics
The decomposition analysis from the previous section suggest that ￿nancial innovation has a
larger long-run impact in ownership than demographics. Since demographic e⁄ects are transitory
we could be under estimating the short-run importance of this factor. The e⁄ects associated
with the introduction of new mortgage contracts should be persistent, but could also have an
important shorter run impact. We explore the short-run implications of these two factors by
solving the transitional dynamics.
We start at t = 0 where we consider an economy when the choice of the mortgage contract
is restricted to the standard ￿xed mortgage contract with a 20 percent downpayment. Since the
population structure in 1994 is not stationary, we solve the model with the observed cohorts
shares for this year. The resulting equilibrium give us the initial asset holding distribution. At
t = 1 we introduce an expanded the set of mortgage choices by introducing a 80-20-0 combo
loan (or a no downpayment combo loan), and then generate the homeownership rate path. We
assume that the introduction of new mortgage contract has not been anticipated by households.
Since the initial population structure is not stationary, we use actual population cohorts between
1994 and 2005 and then use the population shares that would generated as the cohorts converge
to the stationary population structure. This takes approximately 25 periods in the model. To
separate the importance of mortgage innovation from demographic e⁄ects we also solve the
41model without ￿nancial innovation. Figure 4 summarizes the path for the ownership rate.
Figure 4: Transitional Dynamics and the Homeownership Rate



















The introduction of the combo loan has an immediate e⁄ect on the aggregate homeownership
rate. Most of the initial increase is generated by the larger participation of the younger cohorts.
As expected, the initial increase in the ownership rate is larger the lower the downpayment
requirement of the combo loan. In the years that immediately follow, further increases in the
aggregate homeownership rates is attributed to the demographic factors.
As the population structure converges to the stationary distribution, the share of younger
cohorts increases relative to the older cohorts. Despite the introduction of new mortgage prod-
ucts, the participation rates of the younger cohorts are the smallest, and thus, the predicted
aggregate homeownership rate falls. It is important to note that the long-run homeownership
rate is higher than the rate in the initial period. As can be seen in Figure 4, the introduc-
tion of new mortgage contract has lasting e⁄ects on the aggregate homeownership rate whereas
demographic e⁄ects are transitory.
The transition path of homeownership allows us to determine whether the importance of the
various factors di⁄er from the long-run analysis. We focus on the year 2005 and examine the
model predictions. In 2005, the actual homeownership rate was 68 percent. If only demographic
factors are allowed to change, the homeownership rate would increase to 66.3 percent. This
result indicates that the impact of demographic changes are larger in this year than in the long-
run. This is due to a relatively large fraction of households in the middle age cohorts where the
participation rates are higher. If the combo loan requires a ￿ve percent downpayment, the home-
ownership rate would be 68.5 percent. In this case, demographic factors would account for 58
percent of the increase in homeownership and ￿nancial innovation the remainder. On the other
hand, a zero downpayment combo loan results in an even larger increase in the homeownership
rate. In this case, the importance of ￿nancial innovation increases in relative importance. Now,
mortgage market innovation account for 59 percent while demographic factors only account for
41 percent of the total e⁄ect. The message from this analysis is that compared to the long-run,
42demographics factors play a more important role.
6. Post Second World War Housing Boom
The housing boom starting in the mid 1990s has a historical precedent. After World War II,
the homeownership rate increased from 48 percent to roughly 64 percent over twenty years.
This period was not only an important change in the trend, but determined a new level for the
years to come. The expansion in homeownership during the postwar period has been part of
the so-called "American Dream." The evolution of the aggregate homeownership rate between
1900 and 2005 is summarized in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The Evolution of the Homeownership Rate 1900-2005
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Average period (1900-40): 45.9
Data Source: United States Statistical Abstract
The increase in the amount of owner-occupied housing had been a major federal policy
goal since the collapse of mortgage markets during the Great Depression. In the late 1930s
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) played a role in altering the form and the terms
of existing mortgage contracts. Prior to the Great Depression the typical mortgage contract
had a maturity of less than ten years, a loan-to-value ratio of about 50 percent, and mortgage
payment comprised of only interest payments during the life of the contract with a "balloon
payment" at expiration. The FHA sponsored a new mortgage contract characterized by a
longer duration, lower downpayment requirements (i.e., higher loan-to-value ratios), and self-
amortizing with a mortgage payment comprised of both interest and principal. The aggregate
impact of mortgage innovation during this time period has not been formally studied in a full
blown model. Rosen and Rosen (1980) study the determinants of tenure choice and the impact
in homeownership during this time period. They use a time series model where housing is
restricted to be a consumption good, thus ignoring the investment aspects housing. They ￿nd
43that the introduction of tax provisions that favor owner-occupied housing (i.e. exclusion of
imputed rents, the deductibility of property taxes and mortgage interest payments) account for
about 4 basis points of the total increase. Despite these e⁄ects a large part of the total increase
remains unaccounted.
We use our model to test the importance of the introduction of the standard ￿xed rate
mortgage during that time period by running a counterfactual experiment. In this experiment
we employ all the parameter estimated in the benchmark economy for 1994. This year had
about the same level of homeownership as observed during the mid-1960s. Then, we introduce
the demographic structure from the 1940s and we restrict the set of mortgage choices to a 9
year balloon contracts with a 50 percent downpayment. The objective of the experiment is not
to capture the total magnitude observed during this time period, but rather to illustrate the
importance of ￿nancial innovation in two periods where he have observed the largest growth in
aggregate homeownership.32 The model predictions are summarized in Table 17.
Table 17: Homeownership and the 1940s
Simulation Ownership Ownership￿35
Contract Type Population Structure
Data 1945 43.6
12 year balloon (50% down) 1940 stationary 54.9 27.5
9 year balloon (50% down) 1940 stationary 54.9 27.3
9 year balloon (50% down) 1940 actual 54.4 27.3
Data Source: United States Statistical Abstract
The model predicts that the aggregate homeownership rate should fall from around 64 percent
to less than 55 percent. Theses two combined e⁄ects predict close to 10 basis points of the total
decrease. If we compare the magnitude of the introduction of the FRM with the combo loan
we observe that the former had a very larger impact on homeownership. The drop in the
participation rate of the younger cohorts is equally dramatic. Even though the census data for
homeownership rates by age is not ready available the model predicts a decline to 27.3. This is
over 10 basis point drop for the younger cohorts. We view the importance of this counterfactual
experiment as a clear illustration of the importance of innovations in the mortgage market,
rather than a precise quanti￿cation what actually happened during this earlier time period.
7. Conclusions
After three decades of being relatively constant, the homeownership rate steadily increased be-
tween 1994 and 2005. Movements in the homeownership rate in the United States are important
as stated policy is to have high homeownership rates. The objective of this paper is to account
for the observed increase in the homeownership rate and understand the role played by various
factors such as demographics and innovations in the ￿nancial market where new loan products
32A complete analysis would requiere to restimate the model to 1940s aggregates, tax system, and determine
the earnings process for the same time period.
44have been introduced. We construct a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with
housing to measure the quantitative importance of these factors. The model features homeown-
ership as part of the household￿ s portfolio decision, the prominent role of life-cycle e⁄ects; the
coexistence of rental and owner-occupied, the choice of whether to own or rent as well as the
quantity of housing service ￿ ows to consume.
We ￿nd that the long-run importance of demographic e⁄ects for the aggregate homeowner-
ship rate is in the range of 16 to 31 percent. The e⁄ect of the introduction of new mortgage
products range between 56 and 70 percent. The transitional analysis suggests that demographic
factors play a more dominant role the further away from the long-run equilibrium. We show
that the key to understanding the increase in the homeownership rate is the expansion of the
set of mortgage contracts. The new loan products are known as the combo loan and are charac-
terized by lower downpayment requirements. We ￿nd that combo loans tend to be the contract
of choice of for younger cohorts which explains an important part of the increase in the aggre-
gate homeownership rate observed since 1994. Demographic factors are especially important in
understanding participation rate changes of households older than age 50.
The importance of ￿nancial market innovations in explaining increases in the homeownership
rate can be further tested by considering developments in the housing market immediately after
World War II. In the next two decades the homeownership rate increased from 48 percent to
roughly 64 percent. We perform a counterfactual experiment to measure the importance of
the introduction by the Federal Housing Administration of the standard ￿xed rate mortgage
contract to replace the existing balloon contracts that caused part of the collapse in the housing
market during the Great Depression. Our quantitative model suggests that ￿fty percent of the
increase in homeownership can be attributed to the introduction of the new mortgage product.
Table 18: Homeownership Rates Across Countries
Rank Country 1996 2003 Di⁄erence
Spain 76 85.3 9.3
Greece 70 83.6 13.6
Italy 67 75.5 8.5
Belgium 65 72.9 7.9
Luxembourg 66 70.8 4.8
United Kingdom 67 70.6 3.6
Denmark 50 65.0 15
France 54 62.7 8.7
Sweden 43 59.9 16.9
Data Source: UNECE Environment and Human Settlements Division, Housing database
The recent boom in housing is not restricted to the Unites States. In Table 18, we report
homeownership rates in 1996 and 2003 for nine Western European counties. As can be seen, large
increases in homeownership have also occurred in these counties. In particular, Spain, Greece,
Italy, France and Sweden have increases exceeded eight basis points. An obvious question is
whether innovations in mortgage markets also account for the increase in participation rates in
these countries. We leave this question for future research.
45References
[1] Aiyagari, S. R., "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving." Quarterly Review
of Economics,109 (August, 1994), 659-84.
[2] Auerbach, A. J. and L. J. Kotliko⁄, Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge University Press,
(1987).
[3] Auerbach, A. J. and L. J. Kotliko⁄, "The Impact of the Demographic Transition on Capital
Formation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94 (June,1992), 281-295.
[4] Berkovec J. and D. Fullerton, "A General Equilibrium Model of Housing, Taxes and Port-
folio Choice," Journal of Political Economy, 100 (April,1992), 390-429.
[5] Chambers, M. , C. Garriga, and D. Schlagenhauf, "Mortgage Contracts and Housing Tenure
Decisions," Working Paper, Florida State University, July 2007.
[6] Cubeddu, L. and J. V. R￿os-Rull, "Marital Risk and Capital Accumulation," Federal Re-
serve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper, (June, 1997).
[7] Cooley, T.F. and E.C. Prescott , Economic Growth and Business Cycles, in T. F. Cooley, ed.
Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Princeton University Press: Princeton,N.J., (1995),
1-38.
[8] Conesa, J.C. and D. Krueger, "On the Optimal Progressivity of the Income Tax Code",
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53 (October,2006),1425-1450.
[9] Davis, M., and J. Heathcote, "Housing and the Business Cycle," International Economic
Review, 46 (August, 2005), 751-784.
[10] D￿az, A. and M.J. Luengo Prado, "Durable Goods and the Wealth Distribution". Unpub-
lished Manuscript, (December, 2006).
[11] FernÆndez-Villaverde, J. and D. Krueger, "Consumption and Saving over the Life-Cycle:
How Important are Consumer Durables?" Working paper,University of Pennsylvania, (De-
cember,2005).
[12] Fisher, J. D. M., and S. Quayyum, "The Great Turn-of the Century Housing Boom,"
Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, (3rd Quarter, 2006), 29-44.
[13] Flavin, M. and T. Yamashita, "Owner-Occupied Housing and the Composition of the House-
hold￿ s Portfolio Over the Life Cycle," American Economic Review, 92 (March, 2002), 345-
362.
[14] Gabriel, S. and S. Rosenthal. "Homeownership in the 1980s and 1990s: Aggregate Trends
and Racial Disparities," Journal of Urban Economics, 57 (January, 2005), 101-127.
[15] Gouveia, M. and R. Strauss, "E⁄ective Federal Individual Income Tax Functions: An Ex-
ploratory Empirical Analysis," National Tax Journal, 47 (June, 1994), 317-39.
46[16] Glaeser, E.L. and J. Shapiro, "The Bene￿ts of the Home Mortgage Deduction," National
Bureau of Economic Research Working paper, (October, 2002).
[17] Green, R. K. (1995), " Should the Stagnant Homeownership Rate be a Source of Concern?",
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 26 (June, 1995), 337-386.
[18] Gervais, M., "Housing Taxation and Capital Accumulation," Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 49 (October, 2002), 1461-1489.
[19] Harding, J. P., S. S. Rosenthal, and C.F. Sirmans, " Depreciation of Housing, Mainte-
nance, and House Price In￿ ation: Estimates from a Repeat Sales Model," Journal of Urban
Economics, 61 (March, 2007), 193-217.
[20] Henderson, J. V., and Y.M. Ioannides, "A Model of Housing Tenure Choice," American
Economic Review, 73, (March,1983) 98-113.
[21] Henderson, J. V., and Y.M. Ioannides, (1989), "Dynamic Aspects of the Consumer Decision
in Housing Markets," Journal of Urban Economics, 26 (September,1989), 212-230.
[22] Jeske, K. "Macroeconomic Models with Heterogenous Agents and Housing," Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, (Fourth Quarter 2005), 39-56.
[23] Jeske, K. and D. Krueger, "Housing and the Macroeconomy: The Role of Implicit Guar-
antees for Government-Sponsored Enterprises," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working
paper, (August, 2005).
[24] Li, W. "Moving Up: Trends in Homeownership and Mortgage Indebtedness," Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, (First Quarter 2005), 26-34.
[25] Nakajima. M., "Rising Prices of Housing and Non-Housing Capital and Rising Earnings
Instability: The Role of Illiquidity of Housing," Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania,
(2003).
[26] Ortalo-Magne, F., and S Rady, "Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income
Shocks and Credit Constraints," Review of Economic Studies," 78 (April, 2006), 459-485.
[27] Painter, G., and C. Redfearn, "The Role of Interest Rates in In￿ uencing Long-Run Home-
ownership Rates," Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 25, (September, 2002),
243-267.
[28] Platania J., and D. Schlagenhauf, "Housing and Asset Holding in a Dynamic General
Equilibrium Model," Working Paper, Florida State University, (2000).
[29] R￿os-Rull, J.V., "Life Cycle Economies and Aggregate Fluctuations," Review of Economic
Studies, 63 (July, 1996) 465-489.
[30] R￿os-Rull, J.V., "Population Changes and Capital Accumulation: The Aging of the Baby
Boom," The BE Journal of Macroeconomics, 1 (1,2001).
[31] R￿os-Rull, J.V., and V. Sanchez-Marcos, "An Aggregate Economy with Di⁄erent House
Sizes," Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, (September 2006).
47[32] Rosen, H., and K. Rosen, "Federal Taxes and Homeownership: Evidence from Time Series,"
Journal of Political Economy, 88 (Feb. 1980), 59-75.
[33] Savage, H. A., "Who Could A⁄ord to Buy a House in 1995?" Current Housing Reports, H
121/99-1, U.S. Census Bureau, (August,1999).
[34] Segal, L. M., and D. G. Sullivan, "Trends in Homeownership: Race, Demographics, and
Income," Economic Prespectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 22 (2, 1998), 53-72.
[35] Shilling, J., C.F. Sirmans and J Dombrow, (1991) ￿ Measuring Depreciation in Single-Family
Rental and Owner-Occupied Housing￿Journal of Housing Economics 1 (1,1991), 368-383.
[36] Storesletten, K., C. I. Telmer, and A. Yaron, Consumption and Risk Sharing over the Life
Cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics 51 (April, 2004), 609-633.
7.1. Computational Method
Our computation strategy allows us to jointly solve for the equilibrium and the estimation
process. To compute the equilibrium we discretize the state space by choosing a ￿nite grid.
However, choices for both types of consumption are continuous. The joint measure over the
state space ￿ (assets, a, housing, h; mortgage choice, z; periods remaining on the mortgage, n,
income shock, ￿; and age, j); is denoted by ￿(￿) and can be represented as a ￿nite-dimensional
array. The estimation method is a mix between non-linear least squares and an exactly identi￿ed




f￿L1(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)L2(￿)g:
The ￿rst criteria requires the estimate parameters to be consistent with market clearing in














j+1(￿j+1) represents the equilibrium price calculated with parameters ￿j+1 in iteration
j + 1: The second criteria requires the implied aggregates in the model Fn(￿) to match their




The indirect inference procedure proceeds as follows:
￿ Guess a vector of parameters ￿ ￿ (￿;￿;￿0;￿o;￿r;￿k;h) and a vector of equilibrium objects
p = (r;R;tr):
￿ Calculate the social security transfers from the invariant age-distribution.
￿ Solve the household￿ s problem to obtain the value function and decision rules.
48￿ Given the policy functions, calculate the implied invariant distribution ￿(￿); the implied
aggregates fFngN
n=1 and equilibrium objects p:
￿ Calculate L(￿); and ￿nd the estimator of b ￿ that solves
min
￿
L(￿):
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